From this consideration of the culminating point of victory follow the two classes into which Clausewitz divides all wars. "The two kinds of war are, first, those in which the object is the complete _overthrow of the enemy_, whether it be that we aim at his destruction politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms; and, _next_, those in which our aim is merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either for the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to account as matters for exchange in the settlement of Peace."[23] All wars, therefore, are wars for the complete destruction of the enemy, _i.e._ "unlimited object," or wars with a "limited object." In the plan of a war it is necessary to settle which it is to be in accordance with our powers and resources of attack compared with the enemy's resources for defence, and where our culminating point of victory is likely to be, on this side of the enemy's capital or beyond it. If the former--then the plan should be one with a "limited object," such as the Crimea, Manchuria, etc.; if the latter--then the plan should aim at the enemy's total destruction, such as most of Napoleon's campaigns, or the Allies in 1813, 1814, 1815, or as 1866, or 1870. As Clausewitz says: "_Now, the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises, is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages_, not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which, by the nature of its relations, it is impossible for it to be. _This, therefore, is the first and most comprehensive of all strategical questions._"[24] In Clausewitz's two plans for war with France in 1831,[25] this difference is plain. In the first plan, he considered Prussia, Austria, the German Confederation, and Great Britain united as allies against France,--and with this great superiority of numbers he plans an attack by two armies, each of 300,000 men, one marching on Paris from Belgium, one on Orleans from the Upper Rhine. In the second plan the political conditions had meanwhile changed; Austria and Great Britain were doubtful, and Clausewitz held it accordingly dubious if Prussia and the German Confederation alone could appear before Paris in sufficient strength to guarantee victory in a decisive battle, and with which it would be permissible to venture even beyond Paris. So he proposed to limit the object to the conquest of Belgium, and to attack the French vigorously the moment they entered that country. Which strict limitation of the object within the means available to attain it is characteristic of Clausewitz's practical way of looking at things. In each plan, however, a vigorous offensive aiming at a decisive victory was to be adopted. PREPARATION FOR WAR The third place, in respect to its present-day importance, I assign to Clausewitz's clear statement that--