STRATEGIC LINES The salient and re-entrant frontiers, the subtle distinctions between the numerous kinds of strategic lines, and lines of operation, and lines of manoeuvre, etc., etc., etc., which in Jomini and his predecessors and followers play so great, so pedantic, and so confusing a part,--for these Clausewitz has little respect. In his chapter on "The Geometrical Element,"[33] he says, "We therefore do not hesitate to regard it as an established truth that _in strategy more depends upon the number and magnitude of the victorious battles than on the form of the great lines by which they are connected_."[34] Of course he does not altogether leave out such considerations, but the above sentence shows how he regards them as only of minor importance. He therefore frees us from a great deal of pedantry, and takes us back to the heart of things. FRICTION has been already dealt with, so no more need be said here, except about its components. DANGER "An ordinary character never attains to complete coolness" in danger. "Danger in war belongs to its friction, and a correct idea of it is necessary for truth of perception, and therefore it is brought under notice here."[35] BODILY EXERTION Clausewitz says that bodily exertion and fatigue in war "put fetters on the action of the mind, and wear out in secret the powers of the soul." "Like danger, they belong to the fundamental causes of friction."[36] To one who, like Clausewitz, had seen the retreat from Moscow, the awful passage of the Beresina, and the battle of the nations round Leipzig, bodily exertion could not be overlooked. Had he not seen bodily exertion and hardship break up the Grand Army into a small horde of stragglers, and destroy the army of Kutusoff in almost an equal measure, in 1812, as well as practically ruin the spirit, and largely break up the great army of Napoleon in 1813? As for the effects of bodily exertion on the mind, purpose, and resolution of the general, compare Benningsen at Eylau after thirty-six hours in the saddle, or Napoleon at Dresden, by which he lost all the results of his victory. INFORMATION IN WAR "_The foundation of all our ideas and actions_," but "in a few words, _most reports are false_." "When in the thick of war itself one report follows hard upon the heels of another, it is fortunate if these reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of probability." In another passage, in order to illustrate this perpetual uncertainty under which all decisions in war have to be made, he compares two opposing commanders to two men fighting in a dark room and groping uncertainly for one another. "These things which as elements meet together in the atmosphere of war and make it a _resistant medium for every activity_, we have designated danger, bodily exertion, information, and friction."[37] He never loses sight of this; it pervades everything he writes. THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL