There is a popular error that the impedimenta of an Indian Division is enormous; indeed, it has been gravely stated by a serious military critic that it is no uncommon thing for regiments in India to take their mahogany mess tables on service with them. Of course only ignorance of the country and its ways, with a hazy recollection of Chillianwallah and the historic mess table of the 24th Foot, could be responsible for such an erroneous statement. As a matter of fact during this campaign the allowance per man for everything was 10 lbs., and per officer 40 lbs., and no tents were allowed. When we consider that an ordinary soldier's blanket weighs 4 or 5 lbs., an allowance of 10 lbs. need not be called extravagant in a country where snow and ice, heavy rain, and the fiery heat of the sun had in turns to be encountered. Yet marching thus light 28,000 pack animals had to be collected to feed and maintain the force. It will be apparent, then, that the problem of mobilisation on the Indian frontier is very materially complicated by the conditions that exist. Not only the troops and their stores have to be concentrated, but also many thousands of pack animals, and the food for the entire force, man and beast, for as long as the campaign lasts. Add to this that units had in some cases to come immense distances, that the line of railway was a single one, and that the detraining station was a small roadside station without platforms, or conveniences, for disembarking troops, animals, and stores, and we have a compendium of difficulties which would try severely the most perfectly organised scheme of mobilisation. It was therefore a source of gratifica[1]n to the military authorities that the scheme and the railway stood so well the severe test applied to them. On the 1st of April the Division, fully equipped and provisioned, made the first march of the campaign. The force consisted of three Infantry Brigades, each of four regiments, two of which were British and two native; the Divisional troops consisted of two regiments of cavalry, four batteries of Mountain Artillery, one[1] regiment of Pioneers, and three[1] companies of Sappers and Miners. In addition, three regiments of infantry were told off as lines of communication troops. The command of the force was given to Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Low, K.C.B., with Brigadier-General Bindon Blood, C.B., Royal Engineers, as his chief staff officer. The three brigades were commanded by Brigadier-Generals A. A. Kinloch, C.B., H. G. Waterfield, and W. F. Gatacre, D.S.O.; whilst the lines of communication were entrusted to Brigadier-General A. G. Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C. The column under Colonel Kelly will be dealt with separately in a later chapter. FOOTNOTE: [1] Afterwards increased. CHAPTER IV ACTIONS AT THE MALAKAND AND PANJKORA