The religions of ancient Egypt and BabyloniaSayce, A. H. (Archibald Henry)
Religion
The religions of ancient Egypt and Babylonia
Sayce, A. H. (Archibald Henry)
Assyro-Babylonian religion; Egypt -- Religion
To a certain extent, therefore, the general incapacity for abstract
thought which distinguished the Egyptians did not hold good of the
priestly colleges. But even among the priests the abstract was never
entirely dissociated from the symbol. Symbolism still dominates the
profoundest thoughts and expressions of the later inscriptions; the writer
cannot free himself from the sensuous image, except perhaps in a few
individual cases. At the most, Egyptian thought cannot rise further than
the conception of “the god who has no form”—a confession in itself of
inability to conceive of what is formless. It is true that after the rise
of the Eighteenth Dynasty the deity is addressed as _Kheper zes-ef_, “that
which is self-grown,” “the self-existent”; but when we find the same
epithet applied also to plants like the balsam and minerals like
saltpetre, it is clear that it does not possess the abstract significance
we should read into it to-day. It simply expresses the conviction that the
god to whom the prayer is offered is a god who was never born in human
fashion, but who grew up of himself, like the mineral which effloresces
from the ground, or the plant which is not grown from seed. Similarly,
when it is said of him that he is “existent from the beginning,”—_kheper
em ḥat_,—or, as it is otherwise expressed, that he is “the father of the
beginning,” the phrase is less abstract than it seems at first sight to
be. The very word _kheper_ or “existent” denotes the visible universe,
while _ḥat_ or “beginning” is the hinder extremity. The phrase can be
pressed just as little as the epithet “lord of eternity,” applied to
deities whose birth and death are nevertheless asserted in the same
breath. Perhaps the most abstract conception of the divine to which the
Egyptian attained was that of “the nameless one,” since the name was
regarded as something very real and concrete, as, in fact, the essence of
that to which it belonged. To say, therefore, that a thing was nameless,
was equivalent to either denying its existence or to lifting it out of the
world of the concrete altogether.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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