The Religious Sentiment: Its Source and Aim: A Contribution to the Science and; Philosophy of Religion — John Shaqi
The Religious Sentiment: Its Source and Aim: A Contribution to the Science and; Philosophy of ReligionBrinton, Daniel G. (Daniel Garrison)
Religion
The Religious Sentiment: Its Source and Aim: A Contribution to the Science and; Philosophy of Religion
Brinton, Daniel G. (Daniel Garrison)
Religion -- Philosophy
A thought and its privative alone--that is, a quality and its
negative--cannot lead to a more comprehensive thought. It is devoid of
relation and barren. In pure logic this is always the case, and must be
so. In concrete thought it may be otherwise. There are certain
propositions in which the negative is a reciprocal quality, quite as
positive as that which it is set over against. The members of such a
proposition are what are called “true contraries.” To whatever they
apply as qualities, they leave no middle ground. If a thing is not one
of them, it is the other. There is no third possibility. An object is
either red or not red; if not red, it may be one of many colors. But if
we say that all laws are either concrete or abstract, then we know that
a law not concrete has all the properties of one which is abstract. We
must examine, then, this third law of thought in its applied forms in
order to understand its correct use.
It will be observed that there is an assumption of space or time in many
propositions having the form of the excluded middle. They are only true
under given conditions. “All gold is fusible or not,” means that some is
fusible at the time. If all gold be already fused, it does not hold
good. This distinction was noted by Kant in his discrimination between
_synthetic_ judgments, which assume other conditions; and _analytic_
judgments, which look only at the members of the proposition.
Only the latter satisfy the formal law, for the proposition must not
look outside of itself for its completion. Most analytic propositions
cannot extend our knowledge beyond their immediate statement. If A is
either B or not B, and it is shown not to be B, it is left uncertain
what A may be. The class of propositions referred to do more than this,
inasmuch as they present alternative conceptions, mutually exhaustive,
each the privative of the other. Of these two contraries, the one always
evokes the other; neither can be thought except in relation to the
other. They do not arise from the dichotomic process of classification,
but from the polar relations of things. Their relation is not in the
mind but in themselves, a real externality. The distinction between such
as spring from the former and the latter is the most important question
in philosophy.
To illustrate by examples, we familiarly speak of heat and cold, and to
say a body is not hot is as much as to say it is cold. But every
physicist knows that cold is merely a diminution of heat, not a distinct
form of force. The absolute zero may be reached by the abstraction of
all heat, and then the cold cannot increase. So, life and death are not
true contraries, for the latter is not anything real but a mere
privative, a quantitative diminution of the former, growing less to an
absolute zero where it is wholly lost.
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