[82-1] For instance, of later writers from whom we might expect better things, Arthur Schopenhauer. He says in his _Parerga_ (Bd. ii. s. 290): “Ein gewisser Grad allgemeiner Unwissenheit ist die Bedingung aller Religionen;” a correct remark, and equally correct of the pursuit of science and philosophy. But the ignorance which is the condition of such pursuit is not a part of science or philosophy, and no more is it of religion. THE RATIONAL POSTULATES OF THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT. SUMMARY. Religion often considered merely an affair of the feelings. On the contrary, it must assume at least three premises in reason, its “rational postulates.” I. There is Order in things. The religious wish involves the idea of cause. This idea not exhausted by uniformity of sequence, but by quantitative relation, that is, Order as opposed to Chance. Both science and religion assume order in things; but the latter includes the Will of God in this order, while the former rejects it. II. This order is one of Intelligence. The order is assumed to be a comprehensible one, whether it be of law wholly or of volition also. III. All Intelligence is one in kind. This postulate indispensable to religion, although it has been attacked by religious as well as irreligious philosophers. Its decision must rest on the absoluteness of the formal laws of thought. The theory that these are products of natural selections disproved by showing, (1) that they hold true throughout the material universe, and (2) that they do not depend on it for their verity. Reason sees beyond phenomena, but descries nothing alien to itself. The formal laws of reason are purposive. They therefore afford a presumption of a moral government of the Universe, and point to an Intelligence fulfilling an end through the order in physical laws. Such an assumption, common to all historic religions, is thus justified by induction. CHAPTER III. THE RATIONAL POSTULATES OF THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT.