Justice -- Early works to 1800; Political science -- Early works to 1800; Utopias -- Early works to 1800
... Enough of this: the other assertion of Thrasymachus is far {xxii} more
important--that the unjust life is more gainful than the just. *348* Now,
as you and I, Glaucon, are not convinced by him, we must reply to him; but
if we try to compare their respective gains we shall want a judge to
decide for us; we had better therefore proceed by making mutual admissions
of the truth to one another.
Thrasymachus had asserted that perfect injustice was more gainful than
perfect justice, and after a little hesitation he is induced by Socrates
*349* to admit the still greater paradox that injustice is virtue and
justice vice. Socrates praises his frankness, and assumes the attitude of
one whose only wish is to understand the meaning of his opponents. At the
same time he is weaving a net in which Thrasymachus is finally enclosed.
The admission is elicited from him that the just man seeks to gain an
advantage over the unjust only, but not over the just, while the unjust
would gain an advantage over either. Socrates, in order to test this
statement, employs once more the favourite analogy of the arts. *350* The
musician, doctor, skilled artist of any sort, does not seek to gain more
than the skilled, but only more than the unskilled (that is to say, he
works up to a rule, standard, law, and does not exceed it), whereas the
unskilled makes random efforts at excess. Thus the skilled falls on the
side of the good, and the unskilled on the side of the evil, and the just
is the skilled, and the unjust is the unskilled.
There was great difficulty in bringing Thrasymachus to the point; the day
was hot and he was streaming with perspiration, and for the first time in
his life he was seen to blush. But his other thesis that injustice was
stronger than justice has not yet been refuted, and Socrates now proceeds
to the consideration of this, which, with the assistance of Thrasymachus,
he hopes to clear up; the latter is at first churlish, but in the
judicious hands of Socrates is soon restored to good humour: *351* Is
there not honour among thieves? Is not the strength of injustice only a
remnant of justice? Is not absolute injustice absolute weakness also?
*352* A house that is divided against itself cannot stand; two men who
quarrel detract from one another's strength, and he who is at war with
himself is the enemy of himself and the gods. Not wickedness therefore,
but semi-wickedness flourishes in states,--a remnant of good is needed in
order to make union in action possible,--there is no kingdom of evil in
this world.
{xxiii} Another question has not been answered: Is the just or the unjust
the happier? To this we reply, that every art has an end and an excellence
or virtue by which the end is accomplished. And is not the end of the soul
happiness, and justice the excellence of the soul by which happiness is
attained? *354* Justice and happiness being thus shown to be inseparable,
the question whether the just or the unjust is the happier has
disappeared.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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