International law; Natural law; War (International law)
IV. But to proceed to proofs derived from actions. A thing is
understood to be abandoned, when it is cast away; except it be under
particular circumstances, as throwing goods overboard in a storm to
lighten a ship, where the owner is not supposed to have abandoned all
intention of recovery, should it ever be in his power. Again, by giving
up or cancelling a promissory note, a debt is deemed to be discharged.
Paulus the Lawyer, says, a right to property may be renounced not only
by words, but also by actions, or any other indication of the will.
Thus, if an owner knowingly make a contract with any one who is in
possession, treating him as if he were the rightful proprietor, he
is naturally supposed to have relinquished his own pretensions. Nor
is there any reason, why the same rule may not take place between
sovereign princes, and independent states, as between individuals. In
the same manner, a Lord by granting certain privileges to his Vassal,
which he could not legally enjoy without a release from his former
obligations, was supposed by such act to have given him his freedom. A
power derived not from the civil law only, but from the law of nature,
which allows every man to relinquish what is his own, and from a
natural presumption that a person designed to do the act which he has
given manifest proofs of his intention to do. In this sense, Ulpian may
be rightly understood, where he says, that ACCEPTILATION or the verbal
discharge of a debt is founded upon the law of nations.
V. Even omissions, taking all proper circumstances into consideration,
come under the cognizance of the law. Thus the person, who knowing
of an act, and being present at the commission of it, passes it over
in silence, seems to give his consent to it; this was admitted by
the Mosaic Law. Unless indeed it can be shewn that the same person
was hindered from speaking either by fear or some other pressing
circumstance. Thus a thing is accounted as lost when all hope of
recovering it is given up; as for instance, if a tame animal, which was
in our possession, be seized and carried off by a wild beast. Goods too
lost by shipwreck, Ulpian says, cease to be considered as our own, not
immediately, but when they are lost beyond all possibility of being
reclaimed, and when no proofs of the owner's intention to reclaim them
can be discovered.
Now the case is altered, if persons were sent to inquire after the
lost goods, or property, and a reward was promised to the finder. But
if a person knows his property to be in the possession of another, and
allows it to remain so for a length of time, without asserting his
claim, unless there appear sufficient reasons for his silence, he is
construed to have entirely abandoned all pretensions to the same. And
to the same purpose he has said elsewhere, that a house is looked upon
to be abandoned on account of the long silence of the proprietor.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account