International law; Natural law; War (International law)
The Emperor Antoninus Pius, in one of his rescripts, said there was but
little justice in claiming interest upon money after a long period; for
the length of time elapsed was an indication that the debtor had been
excused from payment, from some motive of kindness.
There appears something similar to this in the nature of custom.
For apart from the authority of civil laws, which regulate the time
and manner of custom, and its introduction, it may arise from the
indulgence of a sovereign to a conquered people. But the length of time
from which custom derives the force of right, is not defined, but left
to the arbitrary decision of what is sufficient to indicate general
consent. But for silence to be taken as a valid presumption that
property is deserted, two things are requisite: it must be a silence
with a knowledge of the fact, and with a perfect freedom of will in
the person concerned. For a silence founded in ignorance can have no
weight; and where any other reason appears, the presumption of free
consent must fail.
VI. Although the two requisites already named may be produced, yet
other reasons have their weight; among which length of time is not the
least important. For in the first place, it can scarcely happen, that
for a great length of time a thing belonging to any one should not
some way or other come to his knowledge, as time might supply many
opportunities. Even if the civil law did not interpose to bar remote
pretensions, the very nature of things would shew the reasonableness of
a shorter period of limitation being allowed to present than to absent
claimants. If impressions of fear were pleaded by any one in excuse,
yet their influence would not be of perpetual duration, and length
of time would unfold various means of security against such fears,
either from resources within himself, or from the assistance of others.
Escaping beyond the reach of him he dreaded, he might protest against
his oppression, by appealing to proper judges and arbitrators.
VII. Now as time immemorial, considered in a moral light, seems to
have no bounds, silence for such a length of time appears sufficient
to establish the presumption that all claim to a thing is abandoned,
unless the strongest proofs to the contrary can be produced. The most
able Lawyers have properly observed, that time according to the memory
of man is not an hundred years, though probably it may not fall far
short of that space. For a hundred years are the term beyond which
human existence seldom reaches; a space, which in general completes
three ages or generations of men. The Romans made this objection to
Antiochus, that he claimed cities, which neither he himself, his
father, nor his grandfather had ever possessed.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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