The first thing, in a moral point of view, to be considered is, what tendency the desired object has to produce good or evil; and, if the former has the preponderancy, we are then at liberty to chuse it.--In the second place, if it appears difficult to decide, whether the good or the evil predominates, we may chuse the object, if, in the choice and use of our means, we can give a turn to affairs, that may throw the preponderance into the scale of advantage--or lastly if the good and the evil bear no proportion to each other, nor the means, AT THE FIRST VIEW, appear adequate to the end, if, in pursuing an object, the tendency to good, compared with the tendency to evil be greater than the evil itself when compared with the good; or if the good, in comparison of the evil, be greater than the tendency to evil, in comparison of the tendency to good,[57] we may decide in favour of it. Cicero has treated these abstruse points in a more popular and pleasing manner than abstract reasoning would allow. Applying all the beauties of eloquence to elucidate moral truth, he says, "it is the height of folly and presumption UNNECESSARILY to expose ourselves to dangers. In encountering calamities we must imitate the conduct of physicians who use gentle remedies with weakly constitutions. But in constitutions of a stronger cast, especially, in virulent disorders, they must have recourse to more powerful, though more dangerous expedients. In the same manner, a skilful pilot would not attempt to face the wind directly, but would tack about in order to avoid its fury." VI. An example of evils, that ought by all possible means to be avoided, is furnished by the consultations among the states of Gaul, who, according to the account of Tacitus, deliberated, whether they should make choice of liberty or peace. By liberty is here meant civil liberty, that is, the right of governing themselves, and remaining independent states; and by peace is meant such a peace as would prevent the whole people from being exterminated, a calamity like that which befel the Jews, when their city was besieged by Titus. In such cases reason itself dictates the choice of peace, as the only means of preserving life, which is the immediate gift of God, and the foundation of every blessing. So that the Almighty, as we read in his sacred volume, deems it a kindness, when instead of destroying a people, he permits them to be reduced to slavery. Therefore he admonishes the Hebrews, by the mouth of his prophet, to surrender to the Babylonians, rather than to die by pestilence and famine. What has been said of submitting to disadvantages, and some calamities for the preservation of life or liberty, may be applied to every object of dear value. As Aristides says, it is a moral duty in a storm, to save the ship by casting overboard the goods, but not the crew.