International law; Natural law; War (International law)
VII. In exacting punishment it is necessary to use the precaution of
avoiding hostilities with a power of equal strength. For to avenge a
wrong, or to assert a right by force of arms requires a superiority of
strength. So that not only prudence, but a regard for their subjects
will at all times deter rulers from involving their people in the
calamities of war. A principle of justice too, the sole directress of
human affairs, binding sovereigns and subjects to each other by their
mutual interests, will teach this lesson of precaution. For reparation
must be looked for at the hands of those, who bring on the calamities
of wanton and unnecessary war. Livy calls that a just, which is a
necessary war, and it is a pious cause, when no hope is left, but in
recourse to arms.
VIII. It is but now and then a cause of such imperious necessity
occurs, as to demand the decision of the sword, and that is, when, as
Florus says, the desertion of a right will be followed by calamities
far more cruel, than the fiercest wars. Seneca says, "that it is right
to meet danger, when equal harm would result from acquiescing in an
injury," and in this, he is supported by Tacitus, who calls "war a
happy exchange for a miserable and insecure peace," and the same
animated writer in another place observes, that "an oppressed people
may recover their liberty by daring enterprize, and, if defeated they
cannot be reduced to greater subjection than before;" a sentiment, with
which Livy accords, in naming "peace, when coupled with servitude, a
far more grievous calamity, than all the horrors of war." But it is not
so, as Cicero says, where defeat will be attended with proscription,
and victory with bondage.
IX. Another necessary precaution relates to the TIME, when it is
proper to undertake a war, which depends upon a due calculation,
whether there are resources and strength sufficient to support our just
pretensions. This is conformable to what was said by Augustus, that no
war should be undertaken, but where the hopes of advantage could be
shewn to overbalance the apprehensions of ruin. Scipio Africanus, and
Lucius Aemilius Paulus used to speak in terms not inapplicable to this
subject, for they said "it was never right to try the event of battle,
but under extreme necessity, or favourable circumstances."
The above precautions are of great use, where we hope by the dread and
fame of our preparations to accomplish our object with little or no
danger.
CHAPTER XXV.
THE CAUSES OF UNDERTAKING WAR FOR OTHERS.
Sovereigns may engage in war to support the rights of their
subjects--Whether an innocent subject can be delivered up to
an enemy to avoid danger--Wars justly undertaken in support of
confederates upon equal, or unequal terms--For friends--For
any men--Omission of this duty not blamable, from motives of
self-preservation--Whether war may be justly undertaken in defence
of another's subjects, explained by distinctions.
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