The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914Pratt, Edwin A.
History
The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914
Pratt, Edwin A.
Railroads; Transportation, Military
On the side of the Austrians there was at that time no similar force
available. Three years before there had been published in Vienna
a book, by Oberst. von Panz, entitled "Das Eisenbahnwesen, vom
militärischen Standpuncte," in which the author expressed the view that
details on the following points, among others, concerning railways
should be collected in time of peace and classified for reference
in case of need:--Permanent way: system and construction; gauge and
number of lines; whether lines single or double. Stations: size and
construction; which of them best fitted to serve as depôts. Bridges:
underground works, etc.; which of these could be the most easily
destroyed, or soonest repaired if destroyed, and if prepared beforehand
for destruction. Embankments: size; how made; slope; if provided
with culverts and size of these. Cuttings: length and depth; slopes;
nature of ground; whether much or little water, and whether danger of
landslips. Tunnels: dimensions and construction; if lined or cut in
rock; nature of cuttings at end and whether they can be blocked. Large
bridges and viaducts: system of construction; span of arches; whether or
not the piers are mined.[24] Where men, tools, stores and materials can
be obtained, and to what extent.
These recommendations attracted much attention at the time. They
were quoted by H. L. Westphalen in his book on "Die Kriegführung
unter Benutzung der Eisenbahnen" (Leipzig, 1868), of which a French
translation was published under the title of "De l'Emploi des Chemins
de Fer en Temps de Guerre" (Paris, 1869); yet when, just before the
outbreak of war with Prussia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian
Northern Army recommended that a Construction Corps should be formed,
the Minister of War replied that "the repair of railways was work which
should be done by the railway companies concerned."
All the same, the retarding of the Prussian advance by interrupting
the rail communications became an important phase of Austrian tactics
and was followed up with great activity. Bridges and viaducts were
destroyed, rails torn up, sleepers burned, points and turntables carried
away, tunnels obstructed and water cranes and pumps rendered useless.
At one place (between Libenau and Sichrau), where the railway passed
through a deep cutting, the explosion of mines along the top of each
bank detached great masses of rock which, falling on the lines, filled
up the cutting to a height of six or eight feet for a distance of about
250 ft., and could not be removed until, by means of blasting, they had
been broken up into pieces sufficiently small to be carried away in
ballast trucks.
The arrangements made by the Prussians were, however, so complete as to
permit, in most instances, of a speedy restoration. Even in the instance
just mentioned, fifty Pioneers, aided by twenty labourers, had the line
clear for traffic again before midnight of the day the destruction was
caused.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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