These admissions as to the ease with which the work of destruction could, as a rule, readily be put right again are in full accord with Sir Percy Girouard's report, in dealing with the same subject. It is only fair to accept, in turn, the assertion made by Mr. Steinnetz that the damage which the British did to certain of the railway bridges was "speedily repaired." Some of the later destruction work carried out by the Boers was of a more serious character. The blowing up of the Tugela bridge at Colenso--a structure consisting of five iron lattice girder spans of 100 ft. each on masonry piles--was entrusted by the Boer military authorities to an inspector of the railway company who had served in the Dutch engineers. It was accomplished by the simultaneous detonation of forty dynamite charges all connected by leads to a Siemens and Halske "exploder," the bridge being "thoroughly demolished." In the destruction of the three-span bridge over the Orange River at Norval's Pont the charge employed consisted of about three and a half chests of dynamite, or 198 lbs. Concerning the general destruction of bridges by which the Boers sought to check pursuit after their abandonment of the siege of Ladysmith, Mr. Steinnitz says:--"There was no lack of explosives, and no need to spare them." The central workshops of the Netherlands Company were made use of by the Government for the repair of guns, rifles, wagons, etc., and for the manufacture of war material. Four complete ambulance trains were also fitted up there for the use of wounded burghers. All the traffic on the lines was done on Government orders, and all expenses were charged to them. No private traffic at all was carried. There were, consequently, no railway receipts, and the railway company had no responsibility. DEVELOPMENT OF RAIL POWER In one way or another the South African War of 1899-1902 was concerned in many of the most complicated of the problems that arise in connection with the use of railways for military purposes.[47] In various ways, also, it advanced to a still further stage the whole question of the nature and possibilities of rail-power in war. It confirmed under especially remarkable conditions a fact which the American War of Secession had already established, namely, that even single lines of railway, passing through country occupied by or belonging to the enemy, may allow of campaigns being conducted at such distances from the base of supplies as, but for this means of communication, would render war impracticable. It offered further evidence as to the possibility, in favourable circumstances, of employing railways for the carrying out of important tactical movements. It re-established the essential need of organisation for the attainment of efficiency in military transport and especially in so far as such organisation deals with questions of control and co-ordination of the military and the technical elements.