The military measures taken appeared to be in excess of requirements even when allowance was made for the fact that the campaign was fought in difficult country and that the Germans themselves lost about 5,000 men; but the real significance of the policy adopted lay in the keeping of a considerable proportion of the German expeditionary force in the colony after the rising had, with German thoroughness, been effectively crushed. This procedure attracted attention and adverse comment even in Germany, where doubts were already being entertained as to whether good value was being received for the £30,000,000 which the suppression of the troubles had cost. It was, however, made clear that the still considerable body of German troops left in the colony was being kept on hand there in case of the opportunity arising for its employment in another direction--that, namely, of achieving Germany's aspirations in regard to the conquest of British South Africa, and the final elimination of British influence from Africa in general. Evidence both as to the nature of these continued aspirations and as to the further purpose it was hoped the troops on the spot might effect was forthcoming in various directions. In a book of 416 pages, published in 1905, under the title of "Das neue Südafrika," Dr. Paul Samassa emphasised the part which the German people had taken in the settlement of South Africa; pointed to the close relationship and affinity of feeling between Germans and Boers; encouraged the idea of their mutually looking forward to the opening up of South Africa as "a land of settlement for the German race," and said, further:-- German South-West Africa is, to-day, a strong tramp card in our hands, from the point of view of Weltpolitik. In England much has been said of late as to what a good thing it would be for that country if our fleet were annihilated before it became dangerous.... On our side we might cool these hot-heads, and strengthen the peace party in England, if we reminded them that, whatever the loss to ourselves of a war with that country, England would run a greater risk--that of losing South Africa. We have in German South-West Africa to-day about 12,000 troops, of whom one-half will remain there for a considerable time. In the event of a war between Germany and England the South African coast would naturally be blockaded by England; and there would then be nothing left for our troops to do but to go on to Cape Colony--for their food supplies.