There is no suggestion by either of the authorities mentioned above of any well-organised Construction Corps in Mexico repairing damage done on the railway almost as quickly as it could be effected by the destroyers. Mr. Weekes believed, rather, that it would take years to restore the roads to the condition they were in before the rebellion against President Diaz, and he further declared that it would cost the national lines of Mexico many millions of dollars to replace the destroyed rolling stock, bridges, stations, etc. FOOTNOTES: [5] In May, 1864, when this bridge had been again destroyed, it was rebuilt, ready for trains to pass over, in forty working hours. [6] A division, completely organised, consisted of 777 officers and men, as follows:--Division engineer, assistant engineer, rodman, clerk, and 2 messengers (6). Sub-division I: Supervisor of bridges and carpenters' work, clerk and time-keeper, commissionary (taking charge of transport and issue of rations), quartermaster (in charge of tools, camp equipment, etc.), surgeon, hospital steward, 6 foremen (1 for each 50 men), 30 sub-foremen (1 for each 10 men), 300 mechanics and labourers, blacksmith and helper, and 12 cooks (356). Sub-division II: Supervisor of track, and remainder of staff as in Sub-division I (356). Sub-division III: Supervisor of water stations, foreman, 12 mechanics and labourers, and cook (15). Sub-division IV: Supervisor of masonry, foreman, 10 masons and helpers, and cook (13). Sub-division V: Foreman of ox-brigade, 18 ox-drivers, and cook (20). Train crew: 2 conductors, 4 brakesmen, 2 locomotive engineers, 2 firemen, and cook (11). CHAPTER IV CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR Curtailment of the efficiency of railways during war may be due to friend no less than to foe; and there have been occasions when, of the two, it is the friend who has caused the greater degree of trouble, hindrance and interruption. These conditions have arisen mainly from three causes--(1) questions of control; (2) irregularities in the employment of railway material; and (3) absence or inadequacy of organisation for military rail-transport purposes. When the use of railways becomes an essential factor in the conduct of war, it may appear only natural that the military authority charged with the duty of furthering or defending national interests should, through the Government concerned, have power to command the transport facilities of all railway lines the use of which may be necessary for the movement of troops or other military purposes. Yet, while the soundness of the principle here involved is beyond dispute, there is much to be said as to the circumstances and conditions under which a military control of railways should be exercised.