The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914Pratt, Edwin A.
History
The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914
Pratt, Edwin A.
Railroads; Transportation, Military
Although, in a land torn asunder by revolutionary factions,
many wounds were still bleeding; and although the newly-created
kingdom was threatened by foes within and without and could
organise means of resistance only with great difficulty, there
was, nevertheless, taken in hand a scheme for the construction
of a network of railways designed to extend over the entire
country, while at the present moment the greater part of
that scheme has, in fact, been carried out. In this way King
Leopold has raised up for himself a memorial the full value
and significance of which may, perhaps, be appreciated only by
generations yet to come.
While Belgium was thus shown to have been setting a good example, the
only railways which Prussia then had in actual operation (apart from
the Berlin-Stettin and the Berlin-Breslau lines, which had been begun,
and others which had been projected) were the Berlin-Potsdam and the
Berlin-Magdeburg-Leipzig lines; though Saxony had the Leipzig-Dresden
line, and Bavaria the Nüremberg-Fürth and the Munich-Augsburg lines.
Pönitz, however, excused the backwardness of Prussia on the ground
that if her Government had refused, for a long time, to sanction
various projected railways, or had imposed heavy obligations in
regard to them, such action was due, not to prejudice, but to "a wise
foresight"--meaning, presumably, that Prussia was waiting to profit by
the experience that other countries were gaining at their own cost.
Having dealt with all the arguments he could advance in favour of the
general principle of employing railways for military purposes, Pönitz
proceeded to elaborate a scheme for the construction of a network of
strategical lines serving the whole of Germany, though intended, more
especially, to protect her frontiers against attack by either France
or Russia. Without, he said, being in the secrets of international
politics, he thought he might safely presume that Germany's only fear of
attack was from one of these two directions; and, although the relations
of the Great Powers of Europe were then peaceful, a continuance of those
conditions could not, of course, be guaranteed. So, he proceeded--
We have to look to these two fronts; and, if we want
to avoid the risk of heavy losses at the outset, we needs
must--also at the outset--be prepared to meet the enemy there
with an overwhelming force. Every one knows that the strength of
an army is multiplied by movements which are rapid in themselves
and allow of the troops arriving at the end of their journey
without fatigue.
In a powerful appeal--based on motives alike of patriotism, of national
defence and of economic advantage--that his fellow-countrymen should
support the scheme he thus put forward, Pönitz once more pointed to
Belgium, saying:--
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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