Apart from the initial handicap of having to fight on the defensive because of the comparative slowness of her mobilisation, Russia is the most advantageously situated of all European Powers for war on the grand scale. Britain is dependent on her command of the sea for her food and trade; the existence of both France and Germany more or less depend on supplies from the outer world. But Russia is self-contained. Her vast “lump” of empire can supply all her needs, from food and trade to an unlimited store of first-class fighting material. Mainly agricultural and possessing a comparatively small foreign trade, Russia could face with equanimity a war of any duration. Until the end of the seventeenth century Russia was the Tibet of Europe, and practically cut off from the rest of the world. She could, with very little inconvenience, retire again behind her frontiers and bid defiance to the world. Time has always been her greatest ally, and her strategy is based upon utilising that ally to the utmost. The boundaries between the Tzar’s dominions and those of Germany and Austria are, for the most part, purely artificial. They follow no distinct line of demarcation. The great Russian plain extends far into Prussia and Austria, and along the whole length of the frontiers the only obstacles to the advance of an invading army are forests, marshes and the fact that generally speaking the roads are very poor. Each country has had, therefore, to take defensive measures to remedy the deficiencies of nature. Russia has the chain of fortresses and fortified positions, extending from Kovno to Radom, which are intended to hold an invading force in check until the mobilisation can be completed. Special attention has of late years been given to the defence of the north-western frontier. Plans have been drawn up for the construction of more fortresses and of strategic railways and military roads. But these works are not yet in a sufficiently advanced state to serve any practical end in the present war. Germany, realising the significance of Russia’s military reorganisation, has recently spent huge sums on strengthening her eastern frontiers. The works are by no means complete, but they are more advanced and of more practical service than those on the Russian side of the frontier. To the south where Russia and Austria meet, neither Power has taken or contemplated taking any such extensive measures for defence. Cracow, Lemberg and Przemysl are the only fortresses of any value in Galicia, and they are faced by fortifications of about equal strength on the Russian side.