The operations against these two armies constitute the real “Russian Advance,” the movement intended to prepare for the crushing of Austria and a march on Berlin. That it would be slow was obvious. Opposing it were, at the time under review, about 1,500,000 troops, with two first-class fortresses in Cracow and Przemysl and a hardly less strong position in Lemberg. The question remained, how would Russia act? Would she concentrate her attention on driving the first Austrian army on to Galicia, or would she deliver her main attack on the second army, and invade Galicia from the east, trusting on her success and consequent menace to the communications of the first army to force that army back on to its base? The former course would be the safer, for the first Austro-German army was a more formidable force than the second. The latter course, if the more hazardous, had the merit of speed. The Grand Duke Nicholas decided to adopt this plan, much to the surprise of the Austrians. An army was sent from Warsaw to operate against the Austro-German army in Poland, but the main army, under General Russki, had Kiev for base, and immediate preparations began for a vigorous and sweeping movement through Galicia. It was, however, essential for the success of the plan that the Austro-German army should be held in check until the menace to its rear was strong enough to force it back. If it were to capture Lublin or seriously threaten Warsaw, the whole scheme would be in danger of collapse. It must not be forgotten that while these operations were in progress Austria was fighting on her southern frontier against Serbia and Montenegro. The war in the south naturally affected to some extent the war in the north. A series of victories in the south would undoubtedly have provided the Austrians in the north with the moral tonic they so sadly needed. As it happened, however, the war in the south was a complete failure. Seven attempts were made to capture Belgrade, an utterly defenceless town, but each was repulsed. The invasion of Serbia ended in the rout of Shabatz. The Austrians thereupon abandoned their operations against Serbia, and threw all their forces into the northern war. Whatever advantage was gained by this increase in numbers was for the time being more than counterbalanced by the shattered _moral_ of the additional troops. Mutiny had already done much to destroy the spirit of the troops. The companionship of men who had been routed by the despised Serbians was not calculated to improve matters. However, Austria needed every man in the north to defend her reputation as a first-class military power.