E-text prepared by Brian Coe, David Tipple, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made available by Internet Archive (https://archive.org) Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this file which includes the original illustrations. See 58256-h.htm or 58256-h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/58256/58256-h/58256-h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/58256/58256-h.zip) Images of the original pages are available through Internet Archive. See https://archive.org/details/russianarmyjapan01kuro Transcriber’s note: Underscores are used for italic markup; the three words that end this sentence _are in italics_. Equals signs are used for bold-face markup; the four words that end this sentence =are in bold face=. There are 91 footnotes in the source book marked by characters such as * and †. The footnote markers have been replaced by numbers and each footnote has been moved to the end of the chapter that contains its marker. THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE JAPANESE WAR [Illustration: _General Kuropatkin._] THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND THE JAPANESE WAR, Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East, by GENERAL KUROPATKIN. Translated by Captain A. B. Lindsay, 2nd King Edward’S Own Gurkha Rifles Translator of “The Battle of Tsu-Shima”; “The Truth about Port Arthur,” etc. Edited by Major E. D. Swinton, D.S.O., R.E., Author of “The Defence of Duffer’S Drift”; and Editor of “The Truth about Port Arthur.” With Maps and Illustrations IN TWO VOLUMES: VOL. I. New York E. P. Dutton and Company 1909 Printed in Great Britain TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE “The General stands higher than any other Russian officer, not only in Russian opinion, but in that of professional soldiers all the world over, and if any human agency can change the deplorable situation to Russia’s advantage, Kuropatkin may be the man to do it.”[1] This sentence, written by the military correspondent of the _Times_ in February, 1904, well expresses the sentiment that predominated when General Kuropatkin’s appointment to command the Russian army in Manchuria was announced. “It may be that a military genius would have overcome the moral and physical difficulties we had to encounter. Possibly; but an Alexeieff, a Kuropatkin, a Linievitch, a Grippenberg, a Kaulbars, and a Bilderling were unable to do so,”[2] were the words used by the General himself two years later when reporting to his Sovereign.