With all their strong points, however, the Japanese had weaknesses which I need not enumerate here. There is a saying that “a conqueror cannot be judged,” and we must bow to the victor. I will only add that the issue of the fighting was often in doubt and nearly in our favour, while in some cases we only escaped serious defeat owing to the mistakes of their commanders. It will be seen from the above that before the war we underestimated Japan’s material, and particularly her moral strength. But I will add some further reasons for her success. Without doubt the main rôle in the war should have been played by our fleet. The Headquarter Staffs of the navy and army did keep a detailed account of all Japanese warships, but our naval representatives in the Far East made their calculations in tons, and in the number and calibre of guns. Having thus arrived at a statistical total, satisfactory to us in comparison with the same figures for our Pacific Ocean squadron, they came to the conclusion in 1903 that “Our plan of operations should be based on the assumption that it is impossible for our fleet to be beaten, taking into consideration the present relationship of the two fleets, and that a Japanese landing at Newchuang, and in the Gulf of Korea, is impracticable.” The number of men we would require on land depended on three things: (_a_) The strength in which the Japanese might be able to move into Manchuria and into our territory; (_b_) The strength of our own fleet, and— (_c_) The carrying capacity of our railway communication. Of course, had our fleet gained an initial victory, land operations would have been unnecessary. But, putting this aside, it was only by actually gaining command of the sea that the Japanese were able to denude their own coast of defenders, and, what is still more important, risk a landing in the Liao-tung Peninsula. Had they been compelled to move through Korea, we should have had time to concentrate. Having gained a local superiority in armoured ships by their desperate attack [before a declaration of war] on the fleet in Port Arthur, they obtained the temporary command of the sea, and took advantage of it to the full; while at this, the most crucial period of the war, our fleet did nothing to prevent their concentration. This was especially the case after the death of Admiral Makharoff, when even their operations close to Port Arthur were not hindered at all. The consequences of this inaction were most serious, for instead of being unable to land in the Gulf of Korea, as had been assumed by our Navy Department, the enemy were in a position to threaten the whole coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula.