As our troops were so few in number, Admiral Alexeieff decided to disperse, so as to be in a position to oppose landings at Newchuang, at Kuan-tung, and on the Ya-lu. He also permitted a dispersion of the fleet, with the result that we were scattered everywhere, and too weak in any one spot. The Japanese transport facilities enabled them to land three armies on the Liao-tung Peninsula and only one in Korea. Sending one army to Port Arthur, they commenced with the other three their advance against our Manchurian army, which was slowly concentrating in the Hai-cheng, Liao-yang area. Having taken the initiative at sea, they also seized it on land, and by their quick concentration and advance, were enabled from the very first to place superior numbers against us. Their consequent success in the first engagements also elevated their spirits as much as it depressed our own. They possessed immense advantages in communication, and the transport of supplies, which took us months, was carried out by them quickly and easily. And, what was not less important, a continuous stream of war materials and supplies poured into their ports and arsenals from Europe and America, thanks to the absolute inaction of our fleet. Owing to our inferior railway communication, also, Japan was able to form a large number of new units whilst we were slowly concentrating our army. The theatre of operations in Manchuria had been known to the Japanese since their war with China. They were perfectly acquainted with its climate, its rains, its mud, its hills, and the peculiarities of _kao-liang_.[75] In the hills, in which we were almost helpless, they felt at home. Having been preparing for war for ten years, they had not only studied the country, but had sown it with agents, who were of immense service to them. In spite of their severe, almost cruel attitude, the Chinese population assisted them greatly in their operations; and, notwithstanding our superiority in cavalry, they generally had good information as to our strength and dispositions. We, on the contrary, often operated in the dark. They were greatly superior to us in their high explosive artillery projectiles, their numerous mountain and machine guns, and their abundance of explosives and technical material, both for attack and defence, such as wire, mines, and hand-grenades; while their organization, equipment, and transport were better adapted to the local conditions than ours. They also had a greater proportion of sapper troops than we had. Their educational system was calculated to develop their initiative and intelligence, and the battle instructions with which they commenced the war were very materially altered as it proceeded. For instance, their original regulations did not recommend night attacks; but they soon became convinced of the advantages of this form of fighting, and frequently resorted to it. Owing to the more advanced education of their poorer classes, their non-commissioned officers were better