As I have said, we expected that from January, 1904, the Siberian and Eastern Chinese lines would be able to give us daily five trains each way; but the concentration of one-half of the reinforcements to go to the Far East actually took five months from the declaration of war. One of the most important of the War Minister’s tasks, therefore, was to get the Siberian and Eastern Chinese lines into a more efficient state as rapidly as possible. My scheme was to improve them at first up to a capacity of seven trains each way in the twenty-four hours, and on the southern branch of the Eastern Chinese (along which movements would have to take place through Harbin from both sides, from Pri-Amur and Trans-Baikal) to fourteen pairs of trains. My proposal was approved by the Tsar, who noted against the figure fourteen the words, “Or even up to twelve pairs of military trains.” In the middle of January, 1904, he appointed a special committee to consider the questions of the money and time required for the immediate improvement of the railways as suggested. This committee, consisting of the Ministers of War, Ways and Communications, Finance, and the State Comptroller, was under the presidency of General Petroff, of the Engineers. It was instructed to ascertain what should be done to enable seven pairs of military trains to be run on the Siberian and Eastern Chinese lines, and twelve pairs on the southern branch (from Harbin to Port Arthur). On January 29, 1904, the Viceroy wrote of the state of the Eastern Chinese Railway as follows: “According to my information, there is reason to doubt the official figures as to the carrying capacity and the ability to cope with increased traffic of the Eastern Chinese Railway. Rolling-stock is deficient, and many engines are out of order. The water-supply is so uncertain that the officials have recently been forced to refuse to accept goods for transport. The soldiers are the only reliable portion of the subordinate railway staff, and on this account some alarm is already felt by the higher officials. But the most serious want is that of a sufficient fuel reserve. The bulk of the coal is stocked at Dalny, whence 1,000 tons have to be distributed over the line daily, of which amount only half goes to increasing the reserve, the other half being required for current consumption. To transport the whole of the reserve by rail from Dalny would take about twenty-five days, but the railway would even then be able to cope with the increased traffic for a period of three months only. In war we can scarcely count on the large railway demands being met, as the coal is sea-borne.”