The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
Empire, and we thereby became directly involved in the political
problems of Europe, the greater portion of our troops was required to
garrison the country west of the Dnieper. In 1799 about 100,000 men
were stationed across the frontier,[12] approximately 130,000 formed
two armies in the south-western districts,[13] and in the north some
50,000 were distributed around the capital; the rest were scattered
throughout the country, about 25,000 being on the Siberian and
Caucasian frontiers. Though a continuation of what had gone before,
the military problems of the nineteenth century had to be faced under
more complicated conditions. In the north-west Russia had still to
put the finishing touch to her effort towards an outlet on the Baltic
by gaining possession of the northern shores of the Gulf of Finland
and the eastern shores of the Gulf of Bothnia. In the west the Poles
had to be kept in subjection, and our frontier defended from Prussia
and Austria. We had to maintain the position we had won, and also to
oppose Napoleon’s army of a million men. In the south we had to make
permanent our footing on the shores of the Black Sea, and to guard its
coasts from oversea attack. In the Caucasus and the Far East everything
remained to be done. The consolidation of our position in the two
latter directions, so as to protect, before all else, the Russian
population of the southern districts, demanded an energetic advance.
It was upon the army that a large share of the execution of these
projects naturally fell. Firstly, the beginning of the century was
remarkable for our colossal struggle with France, of which Suvoroff’s
campaign in 1799 was the commencement. We advanced against Napoleon
as the ally of Austria and Germany, whom he was in the process of
destroying; but the campaigns ended in our utter defeat at Austerlitz
in 1805, and Friedland in 1807. The war in our country of 1812–14 was
a continuation of the first two Napoleonic wars, and, notwithstanding
the invasion of Russia by an immense army, and the fact that our troops
were driven back beyond Moscow, Napoleon was defeated, Europe was freed
from his yoke, and Poland became an integral portion of the Russian
Empire. The determination with which Peter the Great and Alexander
I. conducted their struggles against such opponents as Charles XII.
and Napoleon is in the highest degree instructive. In both cases
we commenced hostilities with inadequate numbers, suffered complete
initial defeat at Narva, Austerlitz, and Friedland, but nevertheless
continued the contest. In both cases our troops were reinforced, and
gradually became trained and seasoned; leaders were created by the war
itself, and our numbers increased until we obtained superiority over
the enemy, and finally ended the struggle victoriously by winning the
battle of Poltava in the one case, and by marching into Paris in the
other.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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