The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
The consolidation of our position on the Black Sea, which we had gained
in 1791, was proceeded with energetically, but was not completed, in
spite of three wars waged with Turkey—in 1806–12, 1828–29, 1877–78.
The first ended in our annexation of a portion of Bessarabia. By the
second we acquired the mouths of the Danube and a strip of the Black
Sea littoral, 370 miles long. The interference of the European Powers
in Russian affairs, in order to weaken us in the Near East, led to
the Crimean War of 1854–56, which resulted unfortunately for us, as
we lost our Black Sea fleet and the possession of the mouths of the
Danube. At the time of the Crimean War we had a numerically strong
army, and much excellent material both among the officers and the
rank and file. A great number of the former were of the nobility; the
men were long-service soldiers (twenty-five years); while the warrant
and non-commissioned officers were experienced men, and wielded
considerable authority. But after the successful wars we had waged
earlier in the century the army had deteriorated in war-training
and fallen behind in armament. All ranks had been deeply bitten
by Arakcheeff’s views of military science, the senior ranks being
specially weak. That an army was intended for war was quite forgotten.
Spit and polish and parade smartness were considered far more than
battle efficiency, and more attention was paid to the “manual exercise”
and to ceremonial movements than to anything else. The best proof of
the views held at this period was the way in which commanding officers
of all arms permitted the rifles to be filed and burnished, so that,
in performing rifle exercises, a thousand rifles would flash and ring
together as smartly as one. An officer’s military career depended on
the interest behind him. Without influence only those got on who most
slavishly performed the wishes of their commanders, however cruel or
barbarous. The national movement towards greater personal freedom,
initiated by Emperor Alexander I. after the Napoleonic wars, had
penetrated to the rank and file of the army, but had now been replaced
by an Administration which paralyzed every activity or impulse towards
initiative throughout the country, and acted like a blight on every
grade of the population, civil as well as military. Everyone was, so to
speak, dressed in a tunic buttoned right up to the chin, and looked as
if he had “swallowed a poker.” The whole country, army included, could
say nothing but “Very good,” “Quite so,” and “All correct.” The private
soldier was treated with cruelty, and was badly fed; peculation and
dishonesty of all kinds were rampant. Not only did commanding officers
largely augment their pay from the money granted for the purchase of
forage, but this was winked at as being only natural. As had always
been the system, the commands of regiments were given to the younger
sons of the nobility, to enable them to exist, while the favouritism
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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