The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
Just as had been the case when the Emperor Alexander II. came to the
throne, a great effort in the direction of military economy was made
after the accession of Alexander III., and the army was reduced by
28,000 men; but the conclusion of the Triple Affiance and the rapid
growth of our neighbours’ armaments brought about a fresh
increase in the army, as well as a _rapprochement_ between ourselves
and France, who was equally menaced. To the creation of new units
by Germany and Austria we replied by raising fresh troops or by
transferring men from the Caucasus and the interior to the western
frontier. In this severe race of preparation for war we were unable
to keep up with our western neighbours, not so much in point of
mere numbers as in necessary organization. We were too poor and too
backward, for modern mobilization entails heavy drafts upon the whole
reserve forces of a State, and is deeply felt by the whole nation.
This is what that distinguished German writer, Von der Goltz, implied
when he wrote that modern wars must be waged by armed nations, not by
armies. Other things being equal, success is assured to the side which
can quickest concentrate superior numbers in the field. These forces
must not only be under competent leaders, but must be well supplied,
reinforced, and equipped. It was chiefly in this respect that we soon
felt our inferiority. By forming cadres without any strength, or with
a very small strength, we are able, thanks to our large population,
our numerous reserves and militia, to mobilize an immense number of
troops of sorts—regulars, reservists, reserve units, and militia. But
owing to the shortage of officers and lack of supplies, these units
would vary much in their value for war. While our advanced troops
only could be concentrated as quickly as those of our neighbours, the
reserve troops could be mobilized but slowly, the reserve units would
be quite inadequate, and, finally, the militia would not be embodied at
the same time as the others, and even then only with great difficulty.
But though we had plenty of men and horses, _matériel_—particularly
technical stores—was insufficient (telegraphs, telephones, balloons,
pigeon post, light railways, explosives, tools, wire, etc.). Owing to
the constant advances in scientific knowledge, and to the continual
demands made for increased strength in construction, fortresses are no
sooner built than the whole of their masonry has to be remodelled. We
could not, therefore, keep our armaments and defences up to date, and
they were largely obsolete. Though our siege artillery had received
a certain number of good and modern guns, it was not equal to our
neighbours’ in mobility, and we did not possess nearly enough technical
troops, such as sappers, and mining and railway companies. There was
no organization either for peace or war of the auxiliary services for
the line of communications; the depôt troops it was proposed to form
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