The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
engagement made with the Dunganites and Taranchites in 1871 could be
forgotten. After prolonged discussions, it was decided to return Kuldja
to China, and to ask for £500,000 as compensation. The member who was
most opposed to obtaining a large sum of money from China was, of all
people, the Finance Minister; he apparently overlooked the possibility
that would be conferred by this sum of carrying out the construction
of the Siberian Railway ten years sooner. For this oversight we
paid later. Meanwhile the Chinese assumed a stiff attitude, and
threatened to seize Kuldja, moving troops towards it to Urumchi, Manas,
Kunia-Turfan, and other points. We, in reply, hastily strengthened
our position by sending up troops from Tashkent towards Kuldja. In
1880 we fortified the Barokhorinski ridge, separating it from parts of
Chinese Turkestan in the occupation of the Chinese. I was in command
of our advanced guard, and saw how gladly our troops would have obeyed
the order to advance. They were disgusted at the thought of having to
abandon the splendid country of which we had been in occupation for
nearly ten years, and at the idea of breaking faith with the people
to whom we had promised protection, who were even then crowding round
our camps in alarm at the rumour that we were going to hand them over
to the Chinese. Of course, at the time this question was decided we
entertained a very exaggerated idea of the value of the Chinese troops
themselves, and also of China’s military resources.
Events afterwards moved rapidly. We commenced the construction of the
railway through Manchuria, and occupied the Kuan-tung Peninsula, thus
alarming not only China, but Japan.
Thus, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century matters
became more involved on all sides. Not only did we have to meet the
preparations of Austria and Germany on the west, and threatened trouble
in our frontier districts near Roumania, Turkey, and Afghanistan,
but from 1896 to 1900 we had, in addition, to face the problem of
safeguarding the position we had suddenly—and, for the War Department,
unexpectedly—taken up in the Far East in our advance to the Pacific
Ocean. The magnitude of the task of protecting 11,000 miles of
frontier, and of keeping up forces so as to be in a position to fight
different combinations of no less than nine adjacent States, conveys
some idea of the colossal expense involved.
FOOTNOTES:
[34] [This evidently refers to the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway, completed
in 1904.—ED.]
[35] Our troops on that occasion numbered 2,000. It was an
insignificant affair, in which we only had forty-three casualties.
[36] Seventy-three miles from Kushk fortified post.
[37] [_Sic._ ? Pan-Islamic.—ED.]
[38] [Galicia.—ED.]
[39] [So-called Chinese Turkestan.—ED.]
[40] Not far from Lake Lob Nor (discovered by Prejevalski), into which
the River Tarin flows.
CHAPTER IV
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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