The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
In 1871, when the western provinces of China[39] were convulsed by
the Mohammedan rebellion, we occupied the province of Kuldja in
order to safeguard our own borders. The inhabitants—the Dunganites
and Taranchites—who had previously completely defeated the Chinese
and some of the Kalmuits, gave us very little trouble, and laid down
their arms on our definite promise to make them Russian subjects. But
while our soldiers were doing their work on the spot, our diplomats in
their offices miles away, without consulting any of those with local
knowledge, such as Kaufmann or Kolpakovski, thought fit to promise the
Chinese that as soon as they quelled the revolt and arrived as far as
Kuldja, that province could be restored to them. As a matter of fact,
we hoped, of course, that they would be unable to defeat Yakub Beg, and
so would never gain possession of Kashgaria, and yet we were helping
them towards this very object. The position was a curious one, and in
1876, when I, as Russian envoy, was in Yakub Beg’s camp near Kurlia[40]
negotiating as to the delimitation of the boundary of Fergana, just
conquered by us, he himself remarked on it. He very justly reproached
me with the fact that while I was dealing with him, another officer
of the General Staff, one Lieutenant-Colonel Sosnovski, was, with the
knowledge of the Russian authorities, supplying the Chinese troops
moving against him. His statement was absolutely correct. After
Yakub Beg’s sudden death the Chinese quickly got possession of the
whole of Kashgaria, advanced up to the southern edge of Kuldja, and
asserted their rights to that province also. While Kaufmann urged
most strenuously that we ought not to return the province to them, we
procrastinated. In 1878, when I was at the head of the Asiatic Section
of the General Staff, I put a memorandum before my Chief, Count Heyden,
in which I pointed out the great strategic value of Kuldja to us. I
also stated that, if we felt bound by our loosely given engagement to
return this province to China, we should most certainly be justified
in demanding compensation for the expenses incurred by us during our
eight years’ occupation. I suggested a sum of £10,000,000 in gold, as
being suitable and also opportune for the construction of the Siberian
Railway. My contention was supported by Kaufmann, but our diplomatists
were against it. A special committee, consisting of M. Giers, Minister
for Foreign Affairs; Admiral Grieg, Minister of Finance; Generals
Kaufmann, Obrucheff, and myself, under the presidency of Count Milutin,
was appointed to go into the question by the Emperor Alexander II. M.
Giers and Admiral Grieg were in favour of returning Kuldja to China
without demanding any compensation. Admiral Grieg asserted that Russia
was in no particular need of money, and both Ministers held that we
were bound by the promise to China—a promise lightly made by our
diplomats without the knowledge of the men on the spot—while the other
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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