as to the self-sacrifice and devotion of the army and its readiness to continue the war could hardly have been expected. Unfortunately for us, also there happened to be on the Committee of Imperial Defence two general officers who had been at the front. One had left it; the other had been deprived of his command of an army corps. Clearly, such men as these could not have much assisted this new and important body to insist on the necessity of continuing the struggle. A step taken by me to raise and to maintain the spirit of the army was the rapid promotion of those officers who had most distinguished themselves in the field. We obtained a number of our best senior regimental officers by promoting captains, and, what is more important, we appointed many distinguished officers to the command of regiments without regard to their lack of seniority, or to the fact that some of them were only lieutenant-colonels. In a very short time these commanding officers improved their regiments almost beyond recognition, and fully proved how important a careful selection is in war. By promoting to Major-General those colonels who had most distinguished themselves on service, we began to get at the head of brigades leaders who were worthy of every confidence, and offered a splendid selection from which to choose divisional and corps commanders. A further step which I took to woo victory was to enforce the humane treatment of the Chinese population of Manchuria. I, and those immediately under me, insisted on their being protected (as far as war conditions permitted) from unnecessary hardships, and on their property being guarded, and I made a point of their being promptly paid in cash for everything they brought in. This assisted us considerably in getting supplies, and, notwithstanding the great hardships we ourselves occasionally suffered, I invariably insisted on these relations being maintained. Consequently, not once was I forced to have recourse to requisitioning supplies or transport, nor had I to use force to get local labour. The results surpassed all my expectations, for, in spite of the great efforts made by the enemy to raise the Chinese population against us, and in spite of the unfriendly feeling towards us of many of the Chinese authorities themselves, the mass of the people appreciated our attitude, remained quiet, and, by freely bringing in their products, saved us from hunger. Although they might have easily kept us in a perpetual state of alarm by killing isolated officials, attacking small detachments, destroying the telegraphs and the roads, they—with very few exceptions—lived on peacefully in the theatre of war, in some instances even joining with us in fighting the Hun-huses. Thus, besides the plan of campaign for carrying on the war—in which the possibility of retiring even behind Harbin was foreseen—the principal means taken by me to secure victory were: