The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
1. To instil in all ranks a firm belief that the war could only be
brought to a close with victory, and that till victory had crowned our
efforts not one of us would return home.
2. To foster a constant fatherly endeavour on the part of all in
authority to attend, as far as the exigencies of the Service permitted,
to the comfort and preserve the health of the troops.
3. To assist in all ways the readiness and preparation of the troops,
particularly by accelerating, irrespective of mere seniority, the
promotion of the most distinguished of the officers.
4. To maintain a uniformly humane attitude towards the Chinese
population of Manchuria.
III.
The enemy’s army began to weaken in the moral as well as the material
sense.
To drive back our army northwards to Hsi-ping-kai called for immense
efforts and many sacrifices on the part of the Japanese. I have
stated (in Chapter VII.) that our Headquarter Staff estimated the
total peace establishment of their army at 110,000 men [of which
13,000 were always absent on furlough and leave], and the reserve and
territorial forces at only 315,000, so that the total number available
for service was, as we thought, not more than 425,000. But, according
to the figures of the Japanese army medical authorities, more than
1,000,000 men were called up to the colours, which must have demanded
a great effort on the part of the nation. It was found necessary also,
during the war, to alter the existing laws so as to catch those men
who had already completed their time in the reserve for a further
period of service in the regular army, and to draft into the ranks
in 1904 and 1905 the recruit contingent of 1906 as well as that of
1905. (Towards the end we began to find old men and boys amongst our
prisoners.) Their casualties were very high; in the Cemetery of Honour
in Tokio alone 60,600 men killed in battle were buried, and to these
must be added more than 50,000 who died of wounds. Thus it appears
from these two sources alone that they lost 110,000—a figure equal to
the whole peace establishment of the army. Taking into account our
standing peace army of 1,000,000 men, our losses were comparatively far
lighter than those of the Japanese. In all some 554,000 men passed
through their hospitals during the war, of whom 220,000[55] were wound
cases. Altogether they lost 135,000 men killed and died of wounds and
sickness. Their losses in officers were particularly heavy, and the
men fought with such stubborn bravery that whole regiments, and even
brigades, were on certain occasions almost wiped out of existence. This
happened, for instance, in the fight for Putiloff Hill,[56] on October
15; also during the February fighting for the position held by the 3rd
Siberians on the Kiao-tu Ling [Pass]; in the battle of March 7, at
Tu-hung-tun[57] and other points. At Liao-yang and Mukden the majority
of the enemy’s troops suffered very heavily in their frontal attack of
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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