The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
But such an attenuation of our force in this quarter was contrary
to the opinion of a committee—attended by me in my capacity of War
Minister—which sat in Port Arthur in June, 1903. The Viceroy and senior
commanders of the garrison were present at the meeting when it was
resolved and recorded as “essential” that the 3rd Siberian Corps should
be formed for the defence of Kuan-tung, in addition to the 7th East
Siberian Rifle Division, its permanent garrison, and that this corps
should be composed of the 3rd and 4th East Siberian Rifle Divisions,
each of twelve battalions. In fact, it was considered necessary to have
thirty-six battalions of infantry, exclusive of reserve battalions,
for the defence of Port Arthur and the Peninsula. This formation of a
special army corps for Kuan-tung was thought to be necessitated by the
existence so close to Port Arthur of Dalny, a magnificently equipped
port, connected by railway to the fortress, and a most convenient base
for operations against it.
Feeling that the force allotted to the defence of the Peninsula was
inadequate, on February 11 I telegraphed as War Minister to Alexeieff
that I considered it imperative that the 9th East Siberian Rifle
Division—then under formation—should be sent there in place of the 3rd
East Siberian Rifle Division, ordered to the Ya-lu. The Viceroy did not
concur in this view, but he temporarily retained the 13th and 14th East
Siberian Rifle Regiments.
On February 20, 1904, I was appointed to the command of the Manchurian
Army. In my first communication to the Viceroy (No. 1 of February 24)
I again expressed the opinion that, in view of the possibility of it
being besieged by four or five Japanese divisions, our first efforts
should be directed to strengthening Port Arthur. And I further stated:
“If Port Arthur is weakly garrisoned, and should be besieged,
I might be tempted by that fact to assume the offensive before
there has been sufficient time to concentrate our forces. It is
for this reason that I have already advised the concentration
of the 9th Division in Kuan-tung to replace the 3rd.”
However, the Viceroy again disagreed with me, and wrote in a despatch
of March 1:
“Separate operations against the fortress would only be really
worth undertaking if the enemy could make certain of seizing it
by a _coup de main_, and the moment for this has passed. The
land front is becoming more formidable every day, and, though
not complete, the works are now well advanced; 200 additional
guns have been mounted in Port Arthur itself, and more than
forty at Chin-chou; the strength of the garrison is being
brought up by the reservists arriving from Trans-Baikalia,
and the stocks of supplies are being increased. All the bays
nearest the fortress, as well as the port of Dalny, have been
mined, and for the rest—the oft-proved stubbornness of the
Russian soldier in defence can be relied on.”
He had already reported to the Tsar that—
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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