The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
“Although separate operations against Port Arthur would
threaten the fortress itself with all the hardships of a siege
or blockade, they would be rather advantageous to our arms
as a whole, for they would entail a division of the enemy’s
forces.”
As regards my own recommendations upon the plan of operations to be
followed against Japan, I drew up two memoranda, which I submitted to
the Tsar on February 15 and March 4. In the former I stated:
“In the first phase of the campaign our main object should
be to prevent the destruction of our forces in detail. The
apparent importance of any single locality or position
(fortresses excepted) should not lead us into the great error
of holding it in insufficient force, which would bring about
the very result we are so anxious to prevent. While gradually
growing in numbers and preparing to take the offensive, we
should only move forward when sufficiently strong, and when
supplied with everything necessary for an uninterrupted advance
lasting over a fairly long period.”
Against this the Tsar was pleased to note in his own handwriting the
words “Quite so.”
I left St. Petersburg on March 12, and arrived at Liao-yang on the
28th. On this date there were collected in the concentration area in
Southern Manchuria 59 battalions,[65] 39 squadrons and _sotnias_, and
140 guns. The distribution was as follows:
The _Southern Force_ (under General Sakharoff) of the 1st and 9th East
Siberian Rifle Divisions—20 battalions, 6 squadrons, and 54 guns—was in
the area Hai-cheng—Ta-shih-chiao—Newchuang—Kai-ping.
The _Eastern (Advance) Force_ (under General Kashtalinski) of the 3rd
East Siberian Rifle Division—8 battalions, 24 guns, 8 mountain and 8
machine-guns—was moved to the Ya-lu.
The _Mounted Force_ (under General Mischenko) of 18 squadrons and 6
guns was operating in Northern Korea.
The _Main Body_ was divided into two groups:
At An-shan-chan: 5th East Siberian Rifle Division
of 8 battalions and 24 guns.
At Liao-yang: 2nd Brigades of the 31st and 35th Infantry
Divisions, 22nd and 24th East Siberian Rifle Regiments—21
battalions, 10 squadrons, and 24 guns.
In addition to these, the 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment—3
battalions and 4 guns—was allotted to the protection of the Viceroy’s
Headquarters.
In _Port Arthur_ were the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division—12
battalions, 2 reserve battalions, 3-1/2 battalions of fortress
artillery, and a sapper and mining company.
In _Kuan-tung_ were the 5th, 13th, 14th, and 15th East Siberian Rifle
Regiments, 1 battalion of the 16th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 2
battalions of the 18th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, and 1 reserve
battalion—12 battalions, 20 guns, and 1 _sotnia_ of Cossacks.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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