2) only numbered 12,000 rifles, and the total of the twenty-four battalions of the 1st Siberians only amounted to 10,000. Kuroki’s army, on the other hand, was calculated to number approximately from 65,000 to 70,000 men. The plan of operations for the troops crossing on to the right bank was as follows: The force was to deploy between the position held by the 17th Corps near the village of Hsi-kuan-tun and the heights near the Yen-tai mines, which were to have been held by Orloff’s force of thirteen battalions. Using the Hsi-kuan-tun position as a pivot, the army was to throw its left forward so as to strike the Japanese in flank. The position for the 17th Corps near this village was chosen by Bilderling in preference to that which had been prepared for defence beforehand on the right bank on the line San-chia-tzu–Ta-tzu-pu, and sufficient attention was not paid to its fortification. All that was done was to dig a few trenches, and no field of fire had even been cleared in the _kao-liang_ crops. The consequence was that, in the early morning of September 2, the enemy drove the 137th Niejinsk Regiment from the peak north-east of this place, which constituted the left flank position of the 17th Corps, and to regain this hill became the first thing we had to do. For this Bilderling was given forty-four battalions, with the 3rd Siberians in reserve, while the 1st Siberians and Orloff’s column were to assist by threatening the Japanese right. Both Bilderling and Shtakelberg had been instructed as to what was expected of them, but they were given an absolutely free hand as to their dispositions. Notwithstanding the large force under Bilderling’s command, the operations failed in their object. Although the peak was recaptured on the evening of the 2nd, we were again driven off during the night, and had to fall back some two miles, only halting on the Erh-ta-ho heights.