The reasons of the indecisive issue to the battle were: 1. Shtakelberg’s unskilful disposition of the large force put under his command, which was (as we discovered later) almost three times the size of that opposed to him. 2. The absence of proper control and generalship among senior commanders of the western force. 3. The abortive operations of, and lack of energy displayed by the officer commanding the 10th Corps. (Among other things, he not only retired quite unnecessarily on October 12 from his position on the left bank of the Sha Ho, but also neglected to warn his neighbour in command of the 1st Corps, who was in consequence placed in a critical position.) 4. The useless manœuvres of the officer commanding the 31st Division, who several times ordered one of his brigades to retire without due cause. 5. The unsteadiness of many units.[79] 6. The lack of cohesion in the operations of the 6th Siberians (on the right of the western force). During this battle of the Sha Ho the senior commanders—Generals Bilderling and Shtakelberg—were given instructions as to what was required of them generally, but were left to make their dispositions independently. As will be seen from the above brief sketch of events, the September fighting had no decisive results. The two sides suffered equally, and lost about 50,000 men each. Still, our assumption of the offensive, even with inadequate numbers, greatly improved our strategical position by moving our general front thirteen miles forward in front of Mukden, and afforded us a matter of four and a half months of time. As soon as we occupied the positions on the Sha Ho from Shou-lin-tzu on the right flank to Kao-tu-ling on the left, we set to work fortifying them. Besides ten battalions of the 1st Corps, the whole of the 1st Siberians and twenty-four battalions of the 6th Corps were moved into the general reserve in rear of the centre, and we were confident that we would be able to hold our ground. We still had, however, a very small number of men—indeed, in some units the shortage was alarming. The total strength of the 252 battalions comprising our army on October 25 was only 140,000 rifles, which works out at an average strength of 550 per battalion, while many battalions could not even muster 400 men. Not less disquieting was the lack of officers, which now amounted in the infantry alone to over 2,700, or an average deficiency per battalion of eleven. Meanwhile the drafts to repair wastage were still coming up in driblets. In October and November we only received some 13,000 men. It was not till December 8 that they began to reach us in any quantity; during that month and the first half of January 72,000 arrived. I reported upon this vital question in my letters to the Tsar of October 26 and November 5.