In his despatches of October 23 and 26 His Majesty was pleased to inform me that I had been appointed to the supreme command of all the forces in the Far East, that General Linievitch was appointed to the command of the 1st, and General Baron Kaulbars to the command of the 3rd Army.[80] My first act was to augment the army by adding to it the whole of the 1st Siberian and 61st Divisions, the latter of which was intended by Alexeieff for the Pri-Amur district. This at once added 20,000 rifles to the field army; the leading units also of the 8th Corps began to arrive at the beginning of November, and at the end of the month were concentrated at Mukden. But the main thing which still remained to be done was the improvement of our railway communication with Russia, which became more than ever necessary on account of the increased army to be supplied. On November 28 the effective strength of all three armies, including the 8th Corps, amounted to 210,000 men. Our information as to the enemy put their strength at this date at about 200,000. Although we were rather superior in numbers, our superiority was too slight to insure a successful offensive under the particularly difficult conditions offered by the intense cold weather, and the fact that the enemy’s positions were strongly fortified. The low temperature rendered the lightest trench work practically impossible, and made the provision of a large amount of warm clothing an absolute necessity. Our preparations for the offensive, as regards making Mukden an intermediate base and our engineering work, began in November. In addition to the branch railway to the Fu-shun mines, which was completed that month, a branch was laid to the right flank of our dispositions,[81] and a field line to Rennenkampf’s force on the left.[82] But still, when December came we were not ready to advance, mainly owing to the delay in railway construction, largely caused by the weather. Although I was informed by the War Minister, in a communication dated November 8, that the running capacity of the Siberian and Trans-Baikal lines would from October 28 be brought up to twelve pairs of military trains, we never received as many right up to the end of the war. The result of this was that the expected drafts, as well as the three Rifle brigades, arrived about ten days later than we had calculated on receiving them, and there was great delay in the distribution of warm clothing to the men, particularly felt boots. Very great difficulty also was experienced in collecting the food-supplies necessary for the forward movement, and in organizing new transport units.