The first report of large bodies of Japanese infantry appearing near Ka-liao-ma, on the left bank of the Liao, was received on February 28. News came in also of the enemy moving along the right bank, and of the appearance of their columns at Hsin-min-tun. It was essential to take immediate steps to meet them on the way to Mukden in their turning movement. I thought it was possible, by using the positions of the 3rd Army as a pivot of manœuvre, and withdrawing its right flank on to the line Ling-shen-pu–Shua-lin-tzu–Lan-shan-pu, to leave[90] for the defence of the section between the 3rd Army and the Hun Ho, and of that on the right bank, a total of forty-eight battalions, and to transfer on to the right bank the remainder of the 2nd Army (forty-eight battalions), and, after reinforcing them with twenty-four battalions of the 16th Corps and thirty-two battalions collected from the 3rd and 1st Armies, to detail them for operations against Nogi. The command of the troops collected on the right bank of the Hun was entrusted to Kaulbars, and I pointed out to him several times the particular importance of rapid and energetic action against the turning movement which threatened Mukden and our communications. The first units sent from the main reserve at Mukden to the west were: 1. Towards Kao-li-tun, on the river, to operate against the wide turning movement along the River Liao, a brigade of the 41st Division under Birger. 2. To Sha-ling-pu, the 25th Division, under General Topornin, commanding the 16th Corps. 3. Simultaneously the 2nd Brigades of the 9th and 31st Divisions were concentrated under the command of Topornin, south of the 25th Division, on March 2.