The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
The successive arrangements made by Kaulbars, in view of the enemy’s
advance—already commenced on the right of the 2nd Army; the abandonment
of Ssu-fang-tai; the withdrawal of troops from the right bank; the
relief of corps that had been engaged, and the retention of troops
which had already started towards Mukden, not only disclosed to the
Japanese the possibility of free movement along the right bank of the
river, but delayed the arrival on the western front of reinforcements
from the 2nd Army. General Topornin therefore received no support
either on March 2 or 3; still, he successfully continued on March 3
the attack commenced the day before on the village of Sha-ling-pu.
However, in view of the turning movement that had now become quite
clear against our right flank, Kaulbars ordered a retirement—though the
enemy were in no way pressing us—to the western Mukden fortifications.
The troops took up a line fronting on Ma-tuan-tzu–Wu-kuan-tun, and,
in spite of the orders given, did not occupy either the old railway
embankment or the fortified position west of Lin-min-shan-tzu.
This direct withdrawal towards Mukden placed our troops in a very
disadvantageous position, and enabled the enemy both to continue their
turning movement, and make it wider and more dangerous. Immediately
after our retirement from Sha-ling-pu, they moved forward quickly
and enveloped our western front, and, moving on March 3 across on to
the main Hsin-min-tun road, began to threaten Mukden from the north.
Birger’s brigade, which had now returned from Kao-li-tun, fell back on
Hu-shih-tai station.
The protection of Mukden on the west and north was placed under
Kaulbars, and was undertaken by units joining the general reserve.
1. The composite divisions of three regiments of the 17th Corps under
De Witte took up the fortified position at Khou-kha[91] on the morning
of March 3.
2. A force of seven battalions under Colonel Zapolski was sent to
Hu-shih-tai station.
3. The 10th Rifle Regiment was concentrated at siding No. 97.
4. Eighteen battalions of the 1st Siberians came up as a reserve to
these on March 3.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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