The concentration which I had ordered of the units of the 2nd Army on the right bank of the Hun was taking place extremely slowly. Indeed, some regiments which had already assembled had been sent back to the left bank. When I reached Mukden on the 3rd, I impressed on Kaulbars the necessity of not losing any time, and told him to attack the following day, but gave him a free hand as to the direction of attack. He did not carry out the order, owing to the concentration of his army on the right bank not having been completed. Meanwhile, in the early hours of March 4, the important hamlet of Ssu-hu-chia-pu was evacuated by the 2nd Army, and at the same time Ivanoff withdrew the 15th Division from the position behind the Hun and the right flank of the 3rd Army, which he had been told to defend, without fighting. The latter thus became exposed. A brigade of the 5th Siberians and nine _sotnias_ of cavalry, which had remained on the right bank near Tung-chen-tzu, were moved across to the left. During March 4, which was thus lost to us for offensive operations, Nogi continued his turning movement, which was now becoming enveloping and dangerous. Accordingly, after discussing the matter with Kaulbars, I ordered him on the 5th to concentrate sufficient troops for the purpose, and to attack the enemy’s left, and I again emphasized the fact that our main chance of success lay in the rapidity and energy with which he struck. In an order of the 2nd Army of March 5, a force of forty-nine battalions was organized to make the attack under the command of Gerngross. Here again the concentration was too slow, and the right column only moved out from the line Sha-ho-tzu–Khou-kha about 2 p.m. Its right flank might have been strengthened by a brigade of the 41st Division with Zapolski’s column, and the left flank by sixteen battalions of the 25th Division. We therefore might have contained the enemy on the Yang-hsin-tun–Hsiao-sha-ho-tzu line with a force under Tserpitski, and have attacked with a mass of seventy-seven battalions.