The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
“Information that reached us from Japan showed that the sources
from which she had been drawing the men for her armies were
drained dry, that her finances had been completely exhausted,
that discontent at the long-drawn-out war was already making
itself felt among her people, and that for these reasons her
army could not reckon on further success against our superior
numbers. Therefore, the most searching and exhaustive study of
all our weak points cannot shake the belief prevalent in the
army that our troops in Manchuria would have been victorious if
only the war had been continued.
“It will be for the future historian to decide whether the
troops we put into the field before March, 1905, would have
sufficed for victory.
“Nowadays, with the complicated machinery of modern armies, the
personality of the supreme commander is less important than it
was. Without trusty, able, and energetic subordinates, without
a spirit of initiative amongst all ranks, without a superiority
in numbers, and, what is most important, without a military
spirit amongst the troops and patriotism in the whole nation,
the duty of a Commander-in-Chief is so difficult that it is
far too much for a merely talented leader. It may be said that
a military genius would have overcome the moral and physical
difficulties we had to encounter. Possibly; but an Alexeieff,
a Kuropatkin, a Linievitch, a Grippenberg, a Kaulbars, and a
Bilderling were unable to do so.
“I venture to remind Your Imperial Highness that, on receiving
the orders appointing me to be Commander-in-Chief, I did not
joyfully express my gratitude. I replied to the effect that
it was only a dearth of commanders which led Your Majesty to
select me. If I still firmly believed in victory after the
Mukden battle, I had, indeed, good grounds for so doing.”
The author of the cleverly written article entitled “All about
Commanders” writes as follows:
“The absence of initiative, the habit of always relying upon
superiors, and only acting when ordered to from above, are
characteristics of junior commanders which made the work of
those at the head of the army more difficult. The value of the
time element in war also was forgotten.”
The modern theorist in strategy, Blume, says: “Even the greatest genius
in a supreme commander cannot replace independent action by individual
leaders.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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