The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
Kirilloff and others have made a dead set against the behaviour of the
officers of our General Staff in the late war, but the majority worked
most unselfishly, and did good service commanding units or on the
staff. A large number distinguished themselves by their professional
zeal and gallantry, while some found a glorious death in action. At
their head may be mentioned General Kondratenko, the hero of Port
Arthur. Among the killed also were the gallant General Count Keller,
Staff-Officers Zapolski, Naumenko, Jdanoff, Pekuti, Vasilieff, Mojeiko;
and of those who died from wounds were Andreeiff and Yagodkin. Among
the wounded were four divisional commanders—Lieutenant-Generals
Rennenkampf and Kondratovitch, Major-Generals Laiming and Orloff; also
Staff-Officers Markoff, Klembovski, Gutor, Rossiski, Gurko, Inevski,
etc. Altogether, about twenty officers of the General Staff were
killed and forty wounded. The hostile attitude of the Press towards the
officers, the endeavour of divers persons to undermine their authority,
the indifference of the intelligent classes in Russia to what was
happening in Manchuria, and especially the anti-Government campaign,
which was conducted with the object of creating a mutiny among the
troops, was hardly calculated to raise the soldiers’ _moral_, or to
encourage them to perform acts of heroism. There was no military spirit
in the army.
_The Rank and File._
The rank and file, like the officers, were of two classes: those
serving with the colours, and the reservists. The former were in every
respect good; they were steady in action, enduring and well trained;
but the reservists were on a much lower plane altogether. In the first
place, the older men were unable to stand the arduous conditions of
field service, coupled with the rigours of the Manchurian climate.
They suffered greatly from sunstroke and heart affections when
marching among the hills, and during the hot weather. At the battles
of Ta-shih-chiao, Hai-cheng, and Liao-yang, these men fell out in
such numbers that their units became quite immobile, and absolutely
useless for any offensive operations. Moreover, the 2nd Category
reservists did not know the rifle, and had forgotten everything they
had once learnt when with the colours, and it required real hard work
to instruct and train them up to the level of the serving soldiers. I
have mentioned their unsteadiness. Units which were almost entirely
composed of these men—that is to say, those units which had been formed
by expanding the reserve regiments—were very unsatisfactory: it was
almost impossible to get them into action. The regiments of the 4th
Siberian Corps, which did so splendidly at Ta-shih-chiao, Hai-cheng,
and Liao-yang, were an exception; they were composed entirely of
Siberian reservists, who, though surly fellows and poor marchers, were
men of character and very steady in action. The drafts composed of
young soldiers were magnificent.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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