The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
But persons who had nothing in common with the Social Revolutionary
party, and who sincerely loved their country, aided Russia’s enemies
by expressing the opinion, in the Press, that the war was irrational,
and by criticizing the mistakes of the Government that had failed
to prevent it. In a brochure entitled “Thoughts Suggested by Recent
Military Operations,” M. Gorbatoff referred to such persons as follows:
“But it is a still more grievous fact that while our heroic
soldiers are carrying on a life-and-death struggle, these
so-called friends of the people whisper to them: ‘Gentlemen,
you are heroes, but you are facing death without reason. You
will die to pay for Russia’s mistaken policy, and not to defend
Russia’s vital interests.’ What can be more terrible than the
part played by these so-called friends of the people when they
undermine in this way the intellectual faith of heroic men who
are going to their death? One can easily imagine the state
of mind of an officer or soldier who goes into battle after
reading, in newspapers or magazines, articles referring in this
way to the folly and uselessness of the war. It is from these
self-styled friends that the revolutionary party gets support
in its effort to break down the discipline of our troops.”
Reservists, when called out, were furnished by the anti-Government
party with proclamations intended to prejudice them against their
officers, and similar proclamations were sent to the army in Manchuria.
Troops in the field received letters apprising them of popular
disorders in Russia, and men sick in hospitals, as well as men on
duty in our advanced positions, read in the newspapers articles
that undermined their faith in their commanders and their leaders.
The work of breaking down the discipline of the army was carried
on energetically, and, of course, it was not altogether fruitless.
The ideal at which the leaders in the movement aimed was the state
of affairs brought about by the mutinous sailors on the battleship
_Potemkin_. These enemies of the army and the country were aided by
certain other persons who were simply foolish and unreasonable. One
can imagine the indignation that the M―s, the K―s, and the K―s would
feel if they were told that they played the same part in the army
that was played by the persons who incited the insubordination on the
_Potemkin_; yet such was the case. Firm in spirit though Russians might
be, the indifference of one class of the population, and the seditious
incitement of another, could hardly fail to have upon many of them an
influence that was not favourable to the successful prosecution of war.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account