It must be more frequently impressed on the reservists that they still are soldiers. Local concentrations should be organized for them so that they may get some training, and these should be arranged at such a time of the year as to interfere as little as possible with the crops. This would vary, of course, according to locality. Our recruiting officers are now mainly occupied, like everyone else, with office work; they should be more in touch with the reservists, who should look to them as their commanding officer, adviser, and protector. The relationship now is too purely official. An important matter also is the division of reservists in peace-time. In my opinion it is essential to have three classes. For the first two years after the man leaves the colours he should be considered on furlough; he should be made to wear uniform, and always be ready to be recalled in case of partial or general mobilization. The men of the last two classes should be on a different footing, and should be used on mobilization to fill up services in rear, hospitals, bakeries, parks, transport units, and to guard camps on the communications, etc. REFORMS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE RESERVE TROOPS. We have already seen (Chapter VI.) how, when the war began, we found it necessary, in the absence of any assurance arranged by diplomacy against other contingencies, to be ready for any military eventuality on our Western frontier. Consequently, too great a number of reserve units were included amongst the troops told off to take the field in the Far East. Another reason for this was that we did not really know the qualities of different sections of our army. Our crack troops, taking both officers and men together, of three Guard and three Grenadier divisions, six divisions in all, were left in European Russia, while newly formed corps composed of reserve units were sent into the field. I have already mentioned how my recommendation to mobilize the reinforcements being sent to us immediately after Easter was for various reasons rejected, how they were mobilized a month later than they should have been, and arrived in Manchuria unsettled, untrained, knowing scarcely anything of the new rifle, without having fired a course of musketry, and not having done any combined tactical operations with the other arms.