The troops of the 6th Siberians, which certainly had been in camp for a short time before starting, had not been given a gun or a squadron to enable them to practise combined operations. Of the 4th Siberian Corps, which mobilized under most favourable conditions, only the Omsk Regiment had been trained in artillery, and this was of an old pattern; yet it had to go into action with quick-firing guns. Cavalry were hardly seen. Indeed, if we consider the haphazard selection of commanding officers, the lack of any community of thought amongst the officers generally, the almost complete absence of proper tactical training, the large number of 2nd Category reservists, general dislike of the war, and, finally, the absence of military spirit, it will be evident why some units of the reserve troops failed. In the first battles the troops of the 4th Siberian Corps won a good reputation in the army. The reasons for this were: 1. The splendid character of the men in them. Bluff, surly fellows of Siberia, they were strong in body and stout of heart, and understood better than others the reasons for which we were fighting in the Far East. 2. The careful selection of those in command. 3. The bravery of the officers. 4. The long time they had, compared with other troops, to train and acquire cohesion. But, after the reserve troops which came out from European Russia had received their baptism of fire, they also did well. It is sufficient to call to mind the behaviour of the regiments of the 54th and 71st Divisions at Mukden, as well as those of the 55th and 61st Divisions. But this result was not reached till late, and cost many lives. In a European conflict the fate of a campaign will be far more rapidly decided than it was in Manchuria, for the first battles fought after the declaration of hostilities will have a deciding influence. In the recent war, owing to the slow concentration possible on a single-track railway, the reserve troops might have been collected sooner and given several months to settle down, and have thus arrived at the front more ready for battle. In a European war they will have to be transported into the theatre of operations in a very short time after mobilization. We made a great mistake in forming the reserve troops into separate army corps. In my opinion, it would have been much better to have put them into existing corps—either as third divisions or separate brigades. This would have improved our corps organization, which is too unwieldy and too big for a strength of only twenty-four battalions. With strong corps consisting of efficient self-contained brigades the confusion of units in battle would be minimized.