At the beginning of the war the army had only a small number of machine-guns. Recognizing the value of this weapon, the Japanese quickly introduced it, and furnished their field troops with a large number. We did the same, and several machine-gun companies and sections arrived from Russia during the summer of 1905. But the type of weapon did not satisfy tactical requirements—(1) as regards its weight; and, (2) adaptability to the ground. A pattern must be invented that can be carried even into the outpost line. Our high, unwieldy weapons, with their shields, more resembled light field-guns; and their unsuitable construction, combined with the difficulty of adapting them to the ground, was responsible for the decision that these guns should be organized into batteries, and be treated and used as artillery. Such an opinion is absolutely wrong, for the great volume of fire which they can deliver calls for their distribution at the most important points along the firing-line, and, therefore, a capability of advancing with assaulting columns. The organization of machine-gun companies did not meet the above tactical requirements. Each battalion should have four guns. RESERVE (OR DEPÔT) TROOPS. The reserve or depôt troops should be developed and given an organization which will permit of the wastage in units, both in officers and men, being made good from them immediately after a battle or during a long series of battles. Each infantry regiment should have its reserve (depôt) battalion, which should be formed on mobilization at a strength of 40 per cent. of the combatant establishment of a regiment—_i.e._, at 1,600 men.[42] Of these, 400, or 10 per cent. of the regiment’s strength, should be in the theatre of war. This number should be formed into one company, and should constitute the reserve depôt company of its particular regiment, and be continually feeding it. With every division these companies should be organized together into a reserve battalion of 1,600 men for the immediate replacement of casualties in the regiments of the division. All wounded and sick who are not sent to the base should be attached to this battalion till they are passed as fit. After great battles this reserve would be depleted, and would require filling up from the base depôt. The establishment of the other arms should be kept up to strength by a parallel arrangement. The casualties amongst non-combatants are less, but in their case a reserve is necessary, distinct from the combatant reserve, to make good their wastage. It should be mainly composed of 2nd Category reservists and those of the convalescent combatants not considered fit enough for the ranks.