The war shows very clearly the immense importance of rapidly repairing the wastage in units directly after an action. The Japanese succeeded in doing this, with the result that they were greatly superior to us in numbers. It was more important for us to be able to replace casualties by drafts than to receive reinforcements, and it would have made us stronger. For instance, with five troop trains available in the twenty-four hours, a complete army corps with its baggage and parks took twenty days to reach the front, and increased our strength by some 25,000 rifles. If drafts had been sent up during those twenty-days instead of an army corps, we should have received 90,000 to 100,000 men. In place of cavalry, baggage, artillery, parks, and a small number of infantry, we should have got a large number of the latter. It was infantry we wanted, for in our big battles it was the infantry that suffered so heavily. The number of guns per 1,000 rifles was too large, and the amount of transport and baggage was prodigious, with the result that the 10,000 to 12,000 rifles left in corps resembled an escort to the artillery, parks, baggage, etc.,[43] more than anything else. TROOPS IN REAR—COMMUNICATION TROOPS. By troops in rear I mean those at rest camps, railway troops, road working parties, telegraph sections, motor troops, transport of various kinds, all of which should be under the general officer commanding communications. There is also a large number of men in the departments, institutions, and depôts of all the field administrations, but as in Manchuria these were mostly fixed by the authorized establishment, I will not refer to them. The absence of any prepared organization of troops for the line of communication, however, led to their being formed at the expense of the fighting strength of the infantry. While officers commanding regiments complained of the great wastage of their men on duties in the rear, those in rear complained that the numbers they had were insufficient. Troops for the duties in rear should of course be formed on mobilization. In the part of my report upon the 1st Army which deals with the organization of the communications there is much valuable material which is based on war experience, and may be a useful guide for the future. By the end of August, 1905, the strength of the 1st Army alone was 300,000. Its own communications in rear had a depth of 150 miles and a frontage of 330 miles, including the detachments guarding the extreme left flank and the left flank corps under General Rennenkampf, with which we permanently occupied a front of about 70 miles. Under the general commanding the communications of the 1st Army, which consisted of six army corps, were 650 officers and officials, 12,000 men, and 25,000 horses, and this number was considered inadequate. In my report, I gave as my estimate for the numbers required for one army corps per day’s march in length of communications—