The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
Men.
1. Half company infantry 120
2. Transport 320
3. Road troops 25
4. Postal telegraph working parties 5
―――
Total 470
ENGINEER TROOPS.
The great development of science in warfare is very marked, but the
late war did not display the employment of scientific forces that will
be made in a struggle between two European Powers. In this respect
the Japanese were much better served than we were, but even they were
not technically equipped in the way that will soon be necessary. The
speedy construction of strong fortifications, the laying of railways
(especially of field railways) and construction of metalled roads,
the organization of aerial and wireless telegraphy, of signalling by
heliograph, lamps, and flags, the employment of balloons, motors, and
bicycles, are all duties for which the demand increases every day,
while the great quantity also of artificial obstacles, wire, mines,
hand-grenades, explosives, reserves of entrenching tools, etc., now
required must exist ready for use in large quantities. A much larger
number of engineer troops, including sappers, telegraph and railway
units, than we had available in Manchuria is necessary, in order
that all this technical equipment may be used to the best advantage.
Without touching here upon the railway troops necessary for the proper
service of the communications, the number of which must depend upon the
length of the existing lines, and of those proposed to be laid during
operations, let us consider the question of the number of sapper and
telegraph troops required for one army corps of three divisions.
The spade, which had been forgotten since the Turkish War, has once
more regained its true position. With the volume and murderous
effectiveness of modern fire, neither the attack nor the defence can be
conducted without enormous losses, unless proper and intelligent use is
made of digging. For a protracted defence strong fortified positions
with both open and closed works and all possible kinds of artificial
obstacles are absolutely necessary. Consequently, for the attack of
such positions, special troops are required trained in the use of
explosives and the destruction of obstacles, and in road-making, for
heavy artillery demands good roads and strong bridges.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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