the different status in which Russia held Manchuria from North China was made evident by the vigorous prosecution of the campaign in the former. Ninguta, Kirin, and Tsitsihar fell into the Russian hands about the same time as the evacuation of Peking was announced; Liao-yang was taken late in September, and Mukden and Tieh-ling early in October. Fêng-hwang-Chêng and An-tung were captured even so late as December. On September 7, a solemn thanksgiving was held at the site of the burned town Sakhalien on the right bank of the Amur across Blagovestchensk, in which General Gribsky delivered a speech, and the high priest Konoploff was reported to have said: “Now is the cross raised on that bank of the Amur which yesterday was Chinese. Muravieff foretold that sooner or later this bank would be ours.”[299] ----- Footnote 288: The circular note addressed to the Powers on June 3/16, _China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 49; the letter to the Chinese Government on June 11/24, _China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 18; the Czar’s reply to the Chinese Emperor, _China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 105, etc. The Emperor had sent a specially worded personal message to each of the heads of the French, German, Russian, British, American, and Japanese nations, once about July 19 and again on October 14, that is, before and after the capture of Peking by the allied forces. In each case the Emperor made a special appeal to the person addressed, and begged him to take the initiative in coming to China’s assistance in solving the situation. The various replies are highly instructive. It seems that the Czar supposed that he had alone been singled out by the Chinese Empire for the first special plea, and answered accordingly. See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 1, 51, 56, 61, 78, 79, 105, 113, 252; _China, No. 5 (1901)_, Nos. 5, 24, 72, 108, 134, 174, 197; _China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 18; 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp. 293–296. Footnote 289: _China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 149. Footnote 290: These principles, says Lord Salisbury, on July 15, “have never been accepted by Her Majesty’s Government, nor have we as yet discussed with other powers the circumstances to which those principles might possibly apply.”—_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 44. Secretary Hay thought that the Russian _Chargé’s_ oral communication was “not explicit enough” to enable him to comment upon the so-called fundamental principles of Russia.—_Ibid._, No. 114. Later, about July 30, Mr. Hay replied to Russia by referring to his own circular note of July 3, and said that he deemed it “premature to forecast the means of bringing about those results [i. e., the restoration of order and responsible government in China].”—_Ibid._, No. 140. It is particularly remarkable that two of the Powers most interested in the principles proposed by Russia should be so conservative when the question was propounded by that Power. Footnote 291: