The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and IssuesAsakawa, Kan'ichi
History
The Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues
Asakawa, Kan'ichi
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905; Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 -- Causes
_China, No. 2 (1904)_, pp. 1 and 18.
It is interesting to compare these “fundamental principles” of Russia
with the principles laid down in Secretary Hay’s circular telegraph
addressed to the Powers on July 3, or probably some days before the
Russian note: “... The purpose of the President is, as it has been
heretofore,” it said, “to act concurrently with the other Powers,
first, in opening up communication with Peking and securing the
American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in
danger; secondly, in affording all protection everywhere in China to
American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all
legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a
spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire and a
recurrence of such disorders. It is, of course, too early to forecast
the means of attaining this last result; but the policy of the
Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring
about permanent safety, and peace to China, preserve Chinese
territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed
to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for
the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of
the Chinese Empire.”—The 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_,
vol. i. p. 299. It will be observed that the American note is not only
probably earlier in date, but also much wider in scope, than the
Russian propositions, for the former contains the open door principle,
among others, which receives no reference in the latter. It should be
remembered, however, that the American note was not a proposition to
the other Powers.
Footnote 292:
_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 256.
Footnote 293:
Statements of similar import occur in the _Official Messenger_ of
August 13, in the instructions given on October 25 by Count Lamsdorff
to the Russian Representatives abroad, and those on December 28 by
General Kuropatkin to the governors-general of the Amur and Kwan-tung
Provinces. See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 259–260.
Footnote 294:
Cf. _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 267, 300, 314, 315.
Also see the most interesting Russian document, quoted in _China, No.
2 (1904)_, p. 20. One of its passages reads as follows: “It must not
be forgotten that an attack on the ancient traditions of the Chinese
and on the prestige of their Government might be attended by the most
disastrous consequences; all the more so that the international troops
cannot occupy indefinitely the capital of a country of 400,000,000
inhabitants, whose right to live at home as they please can hardly be
questioned.”
Footnote 295:
_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 306. Also see No. 313.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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