new position appeared plainly to indicate the gaining of Russian influence upon the helpless Foreign Office of Peking. [Illustration: M. LESSAR _Russian Minister at Peking_ ] Nor for two years and a half since the first agreement was reported to have been concluded between Admiral Alexieff and Tartar General Tsêng-chi, had the Manchuria question vexed the world. If the question had concerned none but Russia and China, and the former had been slow to promise and loyal to her pledges and the latter strong enough to guard her own interest, the uncertain conditions in Manchuria would not have constituted, as they did, a grave and continual menace to the general peace of the Far East. Unfortunately, the Russian pledges, on the one hand, were attended by serious conditions, some of which it seemed impossible to fulfill and others contrary to the recognized principles of international intercourse to which Russia had professed constant devotion, and, on the other, China had again and again shown herself impotent to resist what she would otherwise reject. Above all, Great Britain and the United States were, both from interest and from principle, firmly committed in the East to a policy which was in constant danger of being undermined by the conduct of Russia. For Japan, however, the Manchurian question possessed an even graver significance, for, with the fall of the Three Eastern Provinces into the Russian hands, the independence of Korea, as well as the security of Japan herself, would be threatened, while a consequent closure of Manchuria against Japan’s economic activity would seriously maim her growth and life as a nation. It was now considered, therefore, that the irritating situation should no longer be allowed to continue, and that the time had at last come when Japan should with determination deal _directly_ with Russia, in order to effect once for all an arrangement satisfactory and beneficial to all the parties concerned and to the world at large. ----- Footnote 445: _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 57, inclosure (Hosie to Satow, November 7, 1902). Also No. 106 (Townley to Lansdowne, May 5, 1903). Footnote 446: _Ibid._, No. 128 (Hosie, June 22, 1903). Footnote 447: _Ibid._, No. 116 (April 8). Footnote 448: _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 75 (April 15); 113 (May 14). Footnote 449: For the Manchurian side, see p. 227, above. The timber concession on the Korean side will be taken up in a later section. Footnote 450: _China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 75, 115, 128. Footnote 451: _Ibid._, Nos. 115, 129. Footnote 452: Pp. 289 ff., 318 ff., below. Footnote 453: Article 8. See pp. 130–131, above. Footnote 454: See p. 235, note 4, above. Footnote 455: _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 130, inclosure (May 4, 1903). Footnote 456: _Ibid._, No. 71 (April 14). Footnote 457: _Ibid._, No. 122. Footnote 458: _Ibid._, No. 130, inclosure (May 4). Footnote 459: _Ibid._ Footnote 460: