Secretary Hay now hoped that the only possible opposition to be met would come from none but the Chinese Government, and requested the support in the matter[484] of the British and Japanese Ministers at Peking, which was willingly given. So late as on June 5, however, M. Cassini addressed a note to Mr. Hay, inquiring what was the meaning attached by the United States Government to the term “treaty port,” and what action it wished Russia to take. Mr. Hay could only refer, in answer to the first query, to the correspondence which passed between the Russian and the United States Governments in 1899,[485] and request, in reply to the second, that Russia should inform China that it was untrue that the former was, as had been stated by China, preventing the opening of the treaty ports.[486] Secretary Hay was so urgent about this matter that he considered it indifferent whether the opening was granted in a treaty or, as a compromise, by a special Imperial edict.[487] M. Lessar had the first interview after his return with Prince Ching on June 10,[488] and, according to the Japanese press, renewed the original seven conditions,[489] including the refusal of ports. The Prince was believed to have refused to discuss any of the conditions except those regarding the establishment of a sanitary board and the payment of customs duties into the Russo-Chinese Bank at Niu-chwang, which might be reconsidered. The Prince was then granted another five days’ sick leave, returned to the summer palace, and declined to see any foreign Minister.[490] Rumors were then afloat which would have one believe that the Prince, in spite of the earnest protests of the British and Japanese Representatives, was gradually yielding to Russian influence. It is at least significant that at this critical point he informed Mr. Townley, the British _Chargé d’Affaires_, on June 19, that an agreement would soon be arrived at with Russia whereby Manchuria would be preserved to China without any loss of sovereign rights. He added that China would open treaty ports in Manchuria, if she saw fit, after the Russian evacuation.[491] The significance of these remarks could easily be read between the lines. Not only was the Russian evacuation uncertain, but also it was no less patent to Russia than to China that, in the marts, the opening of which was under discussion, namely, Mukden and perhaps Harbin, as well as An-tung and Tatung-kao near the Korean boundary, the immediate trade prospects were not considered so great as the political danger which their opening might to some degree avert. Had the evacuation been certain, and had the commercial consideration been the sole question involved, it would have been unnecessary either to hasten their opening or even to select those very places. Nor would MM. Cassini, Lessar, and Plançon have been so strongly opposed to the proposition. Seen in the light of these considerations, Prince Ching’s