In regard to Manchuria, where the chances for development are far vaster, the Japanese people do not possess there as large vested interests, but entertain as great expectations for its future settlement and industry as in Korea. It was estimated before the present war that there resided more than ten thousand Japanese in Manchuria, who were either under the employment of Russian authorities in public works along the railway, or engaged in such small occupations as laundry work, carpentry, restaurant-keeping, photographing, and hair-dressing,[58] while many of the Japanese women, whose numbers in many a town preponderated over those of men, had been allured by unscrupulous parties, who consigned them to disreputable occupations. Merchants and business men of greater capital and resources would be, as they often have been, attracted to Manchuria, were it not for the exclusive, and in the hands of some of their officials, arbitrary, measures of the Russians.[59] Under normal conditions of peace and “open door,” the immensely greater resources of Manchuria and the much greater productiveness of its people[60] would seem to promise even a more important economic future than in Korea. In summing up our preceding discussion, it may be stated that the natural growth or unnatural decay of the Japanese nation will greatly depend—ever more greatly than it now does—upon whether Manchuria and Korea remain open or are closed to its trade, colonization, and economic enterprise; and that, in her imperative desire for the open door, Japan’s wish largely coincides with that of the European and American countries, except Russia, whose over-production calls for an open market in the East. Thus far we have discussed only Japan’s side of the economic problem in Manchuria and Korea. Passing to Russia’s side, it is seen that her vested interests in Manchuria are as enormous as her commercial success there has been small. The building of the Eastern Chinese Railway has cost the incredible sum of 270,000,000 rubles, making the average cost per verst more than 113,000 rubles,[61] or over $87,000 per mile, besides 70,000,000 rubles lost and expended during the Boxer outrages and Manchuria campaign of 1900,[62] to say nothing of the normal annual cost of guarding the railway by soldiers, estimated at 24,000,000 rubles.[63] The investments in permanent properties alone, besides the railway, are moderately valued at 500,000,000 rubles.[64] In return for these heavy outlays, the trade relations between Russia and Manchuria have been most disappointing. Though it is not possible to obtain the exact figures of the actual trade between Manchuria and European Russia, we can establish approximate estimates in the following manner. According to official returns, exports from Russia to her Far Eastern Possessions were as follows:— 1900 56,000,000 rubles 1901 51,000,000 1902 38,000,000